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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 1999, the Supreme Court decided AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board,1 the Court's first interpretation of the provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 by which Congress intended, among other
goals, to open markets for local telephony to competition. The precise issues
before the Court in Iowa Utilities Board were arcane, but the case principally
involved two questions: First, does the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) have jurisdiction to set prices for unbundled network elements-the
building blocks of the local telecommunications network-or does such
power reside with the states? Second, which such elements do incumbent
telephone companies have the legal duty to unbundle-that is, to offer for sale
on a disaggregated basis-at cost-based rates to competing local-exchange
carriers (CLECs), so that the CLECs can produce their own services?
In addressing the second question, both Justice Scalia's majority opinion and
Justice Breyer's separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board alluded to
the essential facilities and market-power analyses familiar to antitrust
jurisprudence, and invited the FCC, on remand, to consider that body of
law as a possible approach in determining when a network element
would satisfy the "necessary" and "impair" standards of § 251 (d)(2) of the
Telecommunications Act, which govern when a network element is subject to
mandatory unbundling.2
Responding to that invitation by the Justices, this Article explains how
economic analysis and antitrust jurisprudence would inform the Commission's
statutory interpretation of § 251(d)(2). We propose a consumer-welfare model
for the mandatory unbundling of telecommunications networks. In this
Article, we reconcile the "necessary" and "impair" standards of § 251 (d)(2)
of the Telecommunications Act with the economic principles that provide the
basis for antitrust and competition analysis. Our approach is responsive both
to the Court's decision in Iowa Utilities Board and to the FCC's subsequent
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.3
1. 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
2. Section 251(d)(2) provides in full:
In determining what network elements should be made available for purposes of
subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Commission shall consider, at a minimum,
whether-
(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary;
and
(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the
ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the
services that it seeks to offer.
47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
3. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC 99-70, 'j 21 (released Apr. 16. 1999),
available in 1999 WL 221834 ("We nevertheless seek comment on the significance of the
essential facilities standard under section 251(d)(2)."); id. 22 ("We ask parties to describe [the
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To advance the ultimate goal of encouraging the development of a
competitive market for local telephony, the Telecommunications Act of 1996
sets forth rules governing the unbundling of local telecommunications
networks.4 The essence of the Iowa Utilities Board ruling is that the FCC must
devise a limiting principle for implementing these rules. In the 1996 Local
Competition First Report and Order,5 its first stab at implementing the
unbundling rules, the FCC had no serious limiting principle. The FCC defined
a "necessary" unbundling under the statute to be any technically feasible one,
and the First Report and Order gave the definition of "impairment" a
similarly limitless scope. The Commission found that an incumbent local
exchange carrier (ILEC) had to unbundle any nonproprietary network element
if, in the absence of such unbundling, a telecommunications carrier seeking to
offer a service would suffer even the slightest "impairment" of its ability to
do so. The Court, in Iowa Utilities Board, rejected this approach and strongly
suggested that the economic analysis underlying antitrust law provided the
Commission with a useful model for interpreting § 251 (d)(2).6
That is not to say that the Commission's interpretation of § 251 (d)(2)
must incorporate by reference all of antitrust law. Rather, addressing the issue
within the legal context of an agency interpretation of a newly enacted statute,
the Court identified two discrete points along a continuum. The first point,
embodied by the FCC's Local Competition First Report and Order,
authorized any technically feasible unbundling. The second point incorporated
the lessons of the essential facilities doctrine. Only a portion of the continuum
constitutes a zone of reasonable statutory interpretations for purposes of the
Chevron doctrine.7 The First Report and Order was, in the Court's
determination, plainly outside the zone of reasonable interpretations of
"necessary" and "impair." The Court's opinion implies that the essential
facilities doctrine and related economic analysis of demand and supply
essential facilities doctrine] and how it should be applied, if it all, to the determination of which
network elements incumbent LECs must provide on an unbundled basis.").
4. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251-252. For detailed discussions of this open-access regulation, see
ALFRED E. KAHN, LETTING Go: DEREGULATING THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION 47-53. 90-96
(1998); J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CoNTRAcT (1997); Robert G. Harris & C. Jeffrey Kraft. Meddling Through:
Regulating Local Telephone Competition in the United States. J. ECON. PERSp.. Fall 1997. at 93,
102-11; and J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons:
Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1081 (1997). For an analysis of unbundling policy pursued through antitrust
law rather than through regulation, see Abbott B. Lipsky. Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak. Essential
Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999).
5. First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996). This order was vacated in part by
the Eighth Circuit; the Supreme Court then modified the Eighth Circuit's decision in Iowa
Utilities Board. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), rer'd in part and affd
in part sub non. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
6. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 734-36.
7. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837. 842-45 (1984).
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substitution would produce definitions of "necessary" and "impair" that
would safely fall within the zone of reasonable interpretations of § 251 (d)(2).
It does not follow, of course, that the Commission should pick any point that
lies in the zone of reasonableness along the continuum of possible statutory
interpretations. Rather, the Commission should adopt an interpretation that
represents its best efforts to identify the optimal point along the continuum,
where "optimality" is realized through consumer-welfare maximization.
The FCC intimated in its Second Further Notice that it intends to adopt an
approach remarkably similar to that in the Local Competition First Report and
Order. We urge the Commission to accept the invitation of Justices Scalia and
Breyer to bring its interpretation of § 251(d)(2) in line with established
antitrust principles. Indeed, the leading antitrust treatise recently echoed such
advice.8 The purpose of this Article is to explain how the Commission can
successfully put that advice into practice.
In Part II of this Article, we review the pertinent legal and economic
developments in the telecommunications industry that preceded Iowa Utilities
Board, and we provide a context for subsequent examination of the meaning
of the "necessary" and "impair" standards of § 251(d)(2). In particular, we
review the AT&T divestiture of 1984, the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
and the relationship between mandatory unbundling of incumbent local-
exchange networks and the prohibition on Bell company provision of
long-distance services.
In Part III, we examine the reasoning used by Justices Scalia and Breyer
to interpret the "necessary" and "impair" standards of § 251(d)(2). Our
analysis begins with the proposition that Congress did not intend to create a
conflict in objectives between the Telecommunications Act and the existing
body of antitrust jurisprudence. Antitrust law primarily seeks to maximize the
well-being of consumers.9 Similarly, Congress stated that the purpose of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to "promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
8. Endorsing Justice Breyer's analogy to the essential facilities doctrine as "inescapable"
logic, Professor Hovenkamp writes:
The principal purpose of the 1996 Telecommunications Act is to deregulate, and
deregulation can be accomplished only by minimizing the occasions for regulatory
supervision. Competition requires that inputs economically capable of being supplied
competitively-that is, by numerous independent sources-be supplied in that manner.
Forced sharing of such inputs acts as a disincentive to producing them competitively in
the first place and exacerbates and prolongs agency supervision.
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 787'c, at 247 (Supp. 1999).
9. This principle is well established in antitrust law. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents.
468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx 66 (1978)). For special application of the consumer-welfare
criterion to industries undergoing deregulation, see Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust. Deregulation.
and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1005 (1987).
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deployment of new telecommunications technologies.""0 Both antitrust law
and the Telecommunications Act seek to promote the competitive process and
to protect legitimate returns to private investment, not the returns to particular
competitors or particular market structures. The opinions of Justices Scalia
and Breyer recognized these principles. Both Justices indicated that, although
the Commission has the discretion under Chevron to promulgate rules
predicated on reasonable interpretations of the Telecommunications Act, it
would not be reasonable in light of Iowa Utilities Board for the agency to
interpret § 251(d)(2) in a manner that diverged from the essential facilities and
market power principles in antitrust law. In dismissing such economic analysis
as irrelevant to the interpretation of the Telecommunications Act, the FCC
failed to recognize consumer-welfare maximization as the proper objective of
the 1996 legislation.
In Part IV, we set forth a number of guiding principles that together
demonstrate the need for substantive limiting principles for the mandatory
unbundling of network elements. The first principle is that unbundling rules
should emphasize consumer welfare and competition rather than competitor
welfare. A competitor-welfare standard would in effect impose no limit on
mandatory unbundling. Second, the issue is not whether the ILECs will
unbundle their network elements for use by CLECs, but whether the
government will compel the ILECs to do so at regulated prices set on the basis
of total element long-ran incremental cost (TELRIC), which would force
ILECs to subsidize CLECs. The third principle is that the social costs of a
particular unbundling regime may outweigh the gains. Fourth, the
"necessary" and "impair" standards should not rely on an economic
misconception of sunk costs in local telecommunications. Finally, the
apparent justification for mandatory unbundling can be endogenously
distorted by the FCC's own policies, particularly the inefficient and
noncompensatory pricing of unbundled network elements (UNEs)."
In Part V, we offer, as appropriate limiting principles for network
unbundling, those inherent in the essential facilities doctrine and in the
competitive analysis of demand and supply substitution that informs
10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl.. I 10 Stat. 56, 56.
11. Two years before passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Professor William J.
Baumol and one of the present authors wrote:
[R]egulators considerably influence the firm's demand elasticity by their decisions and
policies that affect the firm's actual or potential competitors. Clearly. severe constraint
of firms' entry and pricing will somewhat immunize each enterprise from the
competitive pressures of others. That immunity from competition will reduce the
elasticity of each supplier's demand-that is, it will reduce the loss of business that
results from a rise in its prices. The firm's price elasticity of demand thus must be said
to be endogenously determined by the regulatory process itself ....
It appears especially clear in telecommunications that a firm's price elasticity of
demand is endogenously determined by its regulatory environment.
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK. TOWARD COMPETMON tIN LOCAL TELEPHONY 40-
41(1994).
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traditional antitrust analysis of market power. We use antitrust jurisprudence
to suggest economic definitions for "necessary" and "impair."
One immediate lesson is that sound economic analysis counsels the FCC
to interpret § 251(d)(2) to impose geographic and temporal limitations on
mandatory unbundling. That conclusion flows directly from an established
body of antitrust jurisprudence on market definition and market power. Before
the Commission will be able to conclude with any degree of confidence that
its order of mandatory unbundling would serve the public interest and
enhance consumer welfare, 2 it-or, preferably, the state public utilities
commissions-would be well advised to make market-power determinations
in each relevant geographic market for each network element for which the
agency proposes to mandate unbundling. That market-power analysis should
be based on a specified time horizon, after which the requirement of
unbundling for that network element should sunset unless the access-seeker
successfully carries the burden of proving that consumer welfare would suffer
without the Commission's continuation of such mandatory unbundling.
Second, the definitions of "necessity" and "impairment" should be
refined using the principles of demand and supply substitution. The
"necessity" of unbundling a proprietary network element, and the extent to
which competition would be "impaired" if a nonproprietary element were not
unbundled, depend upon the respective price elasticities of demand and supply
in both the input (unbundled network element) and output (end-user access)
markets. Our recommended approach comports with the analysis of unilateral
effects in the 1992 Merger Guidelines adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.'"
Antitrust jurisprudence has long incorporated such techniques for measuring
market power, 4 including the rules of derived demand first enunciated by one
of the pioneers of modem microeconomic theory, Alfred Marshall,' 5 and
12. Our previous writings have emphasized the equivalence between the public-interest
standard and a consumer-welfare standard. See id.; JERRY HAUSMAN, TAXATION BY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION: THE ECONOMICS OF THE E-RATE 4 (1998); SIDAK &
SPULBER, supra note 4, at 309-10, 340; Jerry Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation
on New Services in Telecommunications, 1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 1; Jerry Hausman & Howard A. Shelanski, Economic Welfare and
Telecommunications Welfare: The E-Rate Policy for Universal Service Subsidies. 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 19, 26-29 (1999); J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209,
1234-38 (1993) (review essay).
13. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552. 41,560-61 (1992).
14. The seminal article is William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 944-45 (1981).
15. See 5 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 381-93 (1922). For other
explications of Marshall's rules of derived demand, see P.R.G. LAYARD & A.A. WALTERS,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 259-72 (1978). Derived demand is similar to, but distinguishable
from, residual demand in the sense that the latter focuses on the demand for the end product and is
calculated for any given firm by subtracting the supply of other firms from the market demand.




subsequently exposited by the late Nobel laureate George Stigler."' The
necessity of unbundling an element, or the likelihood that failing to order
mandatory unbundling of a particular element would impair competition,
should be assessed in light of the existence of competition among different
bundles of end services. Thus, the interpretation of "impair" with respect to
loops, for example, should reflect the existence of substitution among bundles
of services that use different access technologies (such as cable television's
coaxial and fiber-optic infrastructure to provide local access for voice
telephony, or the wireless one-rate plans that encompass "free" roaming and
long-distance calling).
Part V continues by arguing that the essential facilities doctrine sets
forth necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for defining "impairment"
under § 251(d)(2). The complete set of necessary and sufficient conditions
includes a fifth requirement, responsive to the explicit text of § 251(d)(2),
that addresses whether the denial of access to that network element at
TELRIC prices would impair competition at the end-user level. Once the
CLEC has demonstrated that the network element meets the four
requirements already contained in the essential facilities doctrine, the CLEC
must then demonstrate that an ILEC could exercise market power in the
provision of telecommunications services to end-users in the relevant
geographic market by restricting access to the requested network element.
Our five-part test is as follows:
The FCC shall mandate unbundling of a network element if, and
only if:
(1) it is technically feasible for the ILEC to provide the CLEC
unbundled access to the requested network element in the
relevant geographic market;
(2) the ILEC has denied the CLEC use of the network element at a
regulated price computed on the basis of the regulator's
estimate of the ILEC's total element long-run incremental cost;
(3) it is impractical and unreasonable for the CLEC to duplicate
the requested network element through any alternative source
of supply;
(4) the requested network element is controlled by an ILEC that is
a monopolist in the supply of a telecommunications service to
end-users that employs the network element in question in the
relevant geographic market; and
(5) the ILEC can exercise market power in the provision of
telecommunications services to end-users in the relevant
geographic market by restricting access to the requested
network element.
16. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 252-55 (4th ed. 1987).
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The fifth element is implemented by computing the "critical share" of
customers that the ILEC must lose in order to deter the ILEC from
exercising market power in the end-user service market. It is immediately
clear that the FCC's requirement of all "technically feasible" unbundlings,
articulated in the Local Competition First Report and Order, is subsumed
within our five-part framework.
In Part VI, we provide some applications of our impairment test to
particular network elements. Demand-side constraints on the exercise of
market power, such as voice telephony over cable television networks and
wireless telephony, affect all unbundled network elements equally. By
contrast, we examine supply-side constraints at a UNE-specific level. We
conclude that network elements with low fixed costs in geographically dense
areas should not be subject to mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices. The
decision not to mandate unbundling of switches should be made on the basis
of supply-side substitution possibilities alone, while the same ruling on loops
would require demand-side substitution opportunities to be incorporated into
the analysis. The major advantage of a consumer-welfare standard over an
efficient-competitor standard is that the former focuses attention on the end-
user services market and thus allows one to incorporate demand-side
substitution possibilities.
Finally, in Part VII, we discuss efficient procedures for administering the
impairment test. First, we explain why the CLEC should bear the burden of
proving that mandatory unbundling of a particular network element is justified
in a particular geographic market. Second, we contend that any mandatory
unbundling order should automatically sunset within two years of the first
unbundling decision. Third, we explain why state public utilities commissions
should administer a market-power test that is both location-specific and tct-
intensive.
II. A HISTORY OF NETWORK UNBUNDLING
A. From Divestiture to the 1996 Legislation
The modem era in U.S. telecommunications policy began in 1984 with
the breakup of AT&T, the result of an antitrust suit filed by the Department
of Justice.' 7 AT&T and the Department settled the suit in 1982 in what is
17. Many books have been written about the AT&T breakup. See, e.g.. ROBERT W.
CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE COMPETITIVE ERA
(1991); PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION To ESTABLISH
COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES (1996); PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF TilE
BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS (1987).
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known as the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), and thus began the
modem era of telecommunications regulation.'"
The MFJ was the product of regulatory failure. The FCC had waged
numerous battles throughout the 1970s to address the onset of
competition in the U.S. telecommunications industry. Congressional
attempts to revise the basic telecommunications legislation of 1934 failed.
Telecommunications policy subsequently moved from the regulatory and
legislative arena to the federal judiciary with the implementation of the
MFJ. Federal district court Judge Harold Greene administered the MFJ until
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Act marked the
end of the MFJ.'9
Before the MFJ required divestiture, AT&T had consisted of three main
parts: (1) local companies, such as New York Telephone, which provided
about eighty percent of local U.S. telephone service; (2) AT&T Long Lines,
which provided almost all domestic and international long-distance service;
and (3) Western Electric, including Bell Laboratories, which provided most
of the telecommunications equipment for AT&T's local and long-distance
units. After divestiture, AT&T continued to operate the long-distance and
manufacturing units, while the local companies were divested and
organized into seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).' The
individual local Bell operating companies that constituted an RBOC came
to be known as BOCs.
The rationale for the MFJ derived from the "quarantine theory." ''
Before divestiture, the local companies were thought to have market power
due to a "natural monopoly," although they were regulated at both the state
and federal levels to limit the exercise of any such market power. The
quarantine theory determined that the BOCs should not be permitted to
compete in the long-distance, manufacturing, and information services
industries, in which the BOCs could distort competition, until they ceded
18. Modification of Final Judgment, in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub norn. Maryland v. United States. 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The
settlement was a "modification" of an earlier **final judgment" in the sense that it modified a
consent decree into which AT&T and the government had entered in 1956.
19. For an exhaustive discussion of the administration of the MFJ, see MictAEL K.
KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELEcOMMJUNICATIONS LAW 199-248 (1992).
20. For instance, the New England and New York Telephone Companies became part of
NYNEX, which subsequently merged with Bell Atlantic. Recent and pending mergers are likely
to lead to four remaining RBOCs with GTE, the largest independent company, merging with Bell
Atlantic; U S VEST, the smallest RBOC, merging with Qwest. a new long-distance company:
SBC acquiring Ameritech (after having acquired Pacific Telesis); and BellSouth remaining
independent but with an equity interest in Qwest. AT&T divested its equipment manufacturing
company, now called Lucent, in 1998. For an early explanation of the economic rationale behind
this very successful divestiture, see Jerry A. Hausman & Elon Kohlberg. 77te Future Evoltion of
the Central Office Switch Industry, in FUTURE COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 193
(Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds., 1989).
21. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 4, at 55-99.
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their monopoly power.22 The BOCs were forbidden to carry long-distance
calls from one local access and transport area, or LATA, to another. Thus,
the MFJ's long-distance prohibition came to be known as a ban on
"interLATA" services. The quarantine theory suggested that, in the
absence of restrictions on their ability to enter new lines of business, the
BOCs would cross-subsidize competitive services with their monopolized
local services, and would discriminate against competing long-distance
companies when providing the connection to the local network.23 The MFJ
contained a waiver procedure by which the BOCs would request relief from
the MFJ for specific services so long as "there [was] no substantial
possibility that the [petitioning BOG] could use its monopoly power to
impede competition in the market it [sought] to enter." 24
Events soon demonstrated that a district judge had only limited ability
to oversee telecommunications policy in the United States. The technology
of telecommunications was changing rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s with
the introduction of digital computer-driven switches and fiber-optic
transmission, but the court's evidentiary record contained information
primarily from 1976.25 The use of consumer information services became
widespread in France with Minitel, but the United States remained far
behind. Furthermore, the MFJ's waiver process became mired in legal
delay, impeding the economically efficient evolution of new technologies,
such as cellular telephony. In 1993, the average waiver request had been
pending for thirty-six months, despite the fact that the Department of Justice
had opposed relief in only six of the 266 waiver requests filed by the
RBOCs.2 6 By the end of 1993, the average age of pending waiver motions
22. See Modification of Final Judgment § II.D, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28. Information services
were defined to be the interaction of computer services and telecommunications.
23. To "cross-subsidize" means to set prices below incremental cost. See, e.g., BAUMOL &
SIDAK, supra note 11, at 62. In actuality, long-distance service had long cross-subsidized local
service at the direction of regulators, and so the Department of Justice's theory was incorrect. The
amount of the cross-subsidy had increased greatly as the cost of providing long-distance service
fell rapidly after 1950, with regulators refusing to allow long-distance prices to fall as rapidly. See
CRANDALL, supra note 17, at 24-27. MCI recognized the economic opportunity of providing
long-distance service when prices far exceeded costs and regulators would not permit a reduction
in prices by the regulated company. Events soon after divestiture made evident the direction of
cross-subsidy from long-distance to local, as the FCC established above-cost access fees (in
actuality, a tax) on long-distance to continue the cross-subsidy to local service. See TEMIN. supra
note 17, at 306-17.
24. Modification of Final Judgment § VIII.C, 552 F. Supp. at 23 1.
25. Ironically, 1976 was the year of the introduction of both digital electronic switches and
fiber-optic transmission. MCI, the first long-distance competitor of AT&T, had based its
long-distance service on microwave transmission (hence the name from which "MCI" was
derived: Microwave Communications, Inc.), but this technology was becoming obsolete at the
time of the AT&T trial.
26. See Paul H. Rubin & Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Costs of Delay and Rent-Seeking Under the
Modification of Final Judgment, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcON. 385, 385-87 (1995).
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before the district court had grown to 54.7 months,-7 even though the decree
court had fully approved ninety-six percent of all waiver requests filed.S
The parties had agreed to a triennial review of the MFJ, and the first
such review began in 1987. This review led to the removal of the MFJ's
restraint on the provision of information services by the BOCs. Because of
various appeals to the D.C. Circuit and subsequent remands, however, the
first triennial review was not completed by either 1990 or 1993, when the
next reviews had been scheduled to take place. Indeed, a second triennial
review never took place.
The MFJ caused significant harm to consumers. Empirical research has
demonstrated that consumer welfare suffered a loss of billions of dollars per
year because of the delay in introducing new telecommunications services
to consumers. 9 Furthermore, the MFJ decreased long-distance competition
because of its ban on BOC participation. For instance, cellular
long-distance prices were at supracompetitive levels under the MFJ; they
fell almost immediately by about twenty-five percent after the MFJ
restrictions were removed)0 The continuing avalanche of legal filings by
the BOCs, long-distance companies, and other potential competitors of the
BOCs proved unmanageable for a single district court judge.3
B. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
Many people recognized that judicial supervision of the U.S.
telecommunications industry was a failure.32 Congress finally overhauled
the Communications Act of 1934 by passing the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. The new legislation ended the MFJ and returned sole federal
control of the U.S. telecommunications industry to the FCC.
The two provisions of the Act most relevant to the BOCs and other
ILECs were (1) that the BOCs would be permitted to provide long-distance
competition when they had satisfied the requirements of a fourteen-point,
FCC-administered "checklist" ;33 and (2) that they would unbundle their
27. See id. at 392.
28. See id. at 389, 392.
29. See Hausman, supra note 12, at 13-24.
30. See Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in Long-Distance and Teleconnunications
Equipment Markets: Effects of the MFJ, 16 J. MANAGERIAL & DEcISION ECON. 365 (1995).
31. For a recent review praising the MFJ, see Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll. The Bell
Doctrine: Application in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51
STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1271-78 (1999). Joskow and Noll, however, conspicuously fail to consider
the MFJ's deleterious effect on consumer welfare.
32. See, e.g., MACAvoY, supra note 17, at 31-34.
33. All other ILECs, except the BOCs, have been permitted to provide long-distance service.
Indeed, SNET, the local telephone company in Connecticut, which for historic reasons was not
considered a BOC by the MFJ, has been quite successful in providing long-distance service at
generally lower prices than AT&T has offered to Connecticut residential customers.
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
networks to allow competing firms to use network elements to provide
competition in local telephony.
1. Bell Company Provision of Long-Distance Services
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 superseded the MFJ and other
federal regulation, but § 271 of the newly amended Communications Act
continued the interLATA line-of-business restriction in the form of a
complex "checklist" process that required, among other things, that the
RBOCs provide unbundled access to their local exchange networks as a quid
pro quo for entry into interLATA telecommunications.' Such a bargain was
unnecessary. Economic efficiency and consumer well-being justified the
rapid removal of the remaining line-of-business restrictions imposed on the
RBOCs. Moreover, because the 1996 legislation expressly mandated
unbundled access to the local network for competitors, it was superfluous to
retain the regulatory quarantine as a bargaining chip for regulators.
Indeed, the § 271 checklist procedure imposes more onerous burdens
than the MFJ's interLATA restrictions ever did." Before a RBOC undergoes
scrutiny under the checklist, it first must enter into an interconnection
agreement, approved by the state public utilities commission (PUC) in the
state in which the RBOC seeks to originate interLATA calls, with a facilities-
based provider of local exchange service.6 Then the FCC, in consultation
with the relevant state PUC, determines whether the RBOC's interconnection
agreement satisfies the fourteen requirements of the checklist. If the
interconnection agreement passes the checklist, and if the RBOC has
established a structurally separate entity for the provision of in-region
interLATA service, then the FCC must rule on the RBOC's request to
provide in-region interLATA service37 pursuant to the general public-interest
standard of the Telecommunications Act.
38
Although the FCC must approve or reject the RBOC's application
within ninety days, the complexity of the checklist and the related approval
34. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
35. Compare PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: SPECIAl.
REPORT 32-33 (1996) (describing the requirements a Bell company must now meet to receive
interexchange relief under the Act), with MACAvOY, supra note 17, at 190-200 (describing
companies' experiences with the interLATA restrictions before the Telecommunications Act of
1996).
36. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(A). Alternatively, if the state PUC had approved a generic
interconnection plan offered by the RBOC, but the RBOC had received no request for
interconnection within the first seven months after enactment of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, then the RBOC would have been entitled to be evaluated under the checklist. See id.
§ 271(c)(1)(B).
37. See id. § 271(d)(3).
38. Commands to honor the "public interest" pervade the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
It has long been recognized that advancing the "public interest" is the touchstone of
telecommunications regulation in the United States. See generally sources cited supra note 12.
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process has produced time-consuming disputes on matters of fact, law,
economics, and engineering. That complexity-along with the provision
authorizing the FCC to suspend or revoke its approval of the RBOC's
provision of in-region interLATA service and the related provision creating
a process for the filing of complaints by private parties upon which the FCC
must act within ninety days39 -creates a rich opportunity for strategic
gaming by interexchange carriers seeking to block RBOC entry into
long-distance markets. The costs generated by the delay in obtaining
waivers of the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions indicate the kinds of costs
that consumers could incur under the similar quarantine approach of the
checklist. The process of construing and applying the checklist will fuel
extensive litigation. Because the outcome of such litigation will determine
when a RBOC will be allowed to compete in lucrative interLATA markets,
one can expect incumbent interexchange carriers to contest the litigation
fiercely.
Most students of telecommunications agree that customers want some
degree of one-stop shopping. AT&T, MCI-WorldCom, and Sprint have all
stated publicly that they believe one-stop shopping to be important
competitively. BOC entry into long-distance service will permit the BOCs
to offer one-stop shopping to compete with AT&T, MCI-WorldCom,
Sprint, and other companies. Increased choice makes consumers better off,
so they will benefit from BOC entry into long-distance service. Increased
choice will not be the only consumer effect of BOC entry, however. Lower
long-distance prices and increased long-distance competition will be the
main benefit. In a market of about $70 billion per year, price decreases will
create consumer benefits in the billions of dollars each year.
Moreover, BOC entry into long-distance service will increase the
economic incentives and the ability of interexchange carriers (IXCs) to
begin to offer local services. BOC entry will remove restrictions on AT&T,
MCI-WorldCom, Sprint, and other IXCs from bundling resold local
services with their long-distance services. The removal of bundling
restrictions will increase the expected economic return to IXCs from
offering local services. Also, once the BOCs begin to offer bundled
packages of local and long-distance services, IXCs will have to respond
competitively with similar bundled packages of local and long-distance
services. Increased competition by BOCs in long-distance markets will
benefit consumers through lower long-distance prices and through one-stop
bundled packages of local and long-distance services offered by the BOCs
and by the IXCs. The goal of increased competition of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 will be furthered because competition
will increase in both long-distance and local markets.
39. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(6)(B).
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An additional benefit of BOC entry will be the ability of the BOCs to
engage in joint marketing of local, long-distance, and mobile packages. The
ability to market jointly will also increase competition in both local markets
(where IXCs and other competitors will be required by competition to
respond with competitive offerings) and in long-distance and mobile
markets (where, again, competitive offerings will expand and prices will
decrease). The current policy restricting bundled offerings and joint
marketing is a restriction on competition by regulation, which is harming
consumers40 and has produced what Paul MacAvoy has dubbed
"regulation's rendition of Waiting for Godot." 41
2. Competition in Local Telephony
Sections 251 and 252 of the Communications Act, added by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, are the core provisions by which Congress
sought to open local telephone markets to competition.42 Those two sections
address the pricing of unbundled access to the network of the ILEC.
The Act envisions three ways for a firm to enter local telephony. The first
method is "interconnection." Under this scheme, a firm builds its own
network and interconnects with the network of an ILEC, so that the entrant's
customers can complete calls to the incumbent's customers. The ILEC would
charge the entrant to complete a call originating on the entrant's network, and
vice versa. The relevant policy question here is the amount of money each
party should be able to charge the other for completing calls.
A firm can also enter local telephony through "resale," which means that
the entrant buys from the ILEC, at wholesale price, the basic service provided
to the customer. The entrant then retails that service to its customers under its
own brand name, sometimes combining the service with other offerings. The
size of the wholesale discount is the pertinent policy question under this
scheme.
Finally, the third method of entry is through the leasing of unbundled
network elements, the building blocks of the local network. The entrant can
then build its own network A la carte by buying some inputs from the ILEC
and procuring other inputs from rivals already in the market (such as local
40. Using a long-distance elasticity estimate of -0.723 and an economic model of AT&T's
price leadership in residential long-distance service, one of us has computed that BOC entry will
decrease long-distance prices by at least 15% to 25%. See Declaration of Professor Jerry A.
Hausman, Second Application by BellSouth Corporation et al. for Provision of In-Region.
InterLATA Services in Louisiana, FCC 98-121, 15 (filed July 9, 1998) (on file with The Yale
Law Journal).
41. MACAVOY, supra note 17, at 176.
42. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251-252. In addition, Congress abolished any remaining legal barriers to
entry: "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit
or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service." Id. § 253(a).
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transport services provided by competitive access providers) or directly from
equipment vendors (such as manufacturers of switches). This method of entry
is known as "unbundling."
Sections 251 and 252 provide a skeleton for the pricing of
interconnection, resale, and unbundling. 3 Section 251(c)(3) requires any
ILEC (other than certain rural carriers)" to offer competitors access to the
ILEC's network elements on an unbundled basis. 5 In turn, § 251(d)(2)
requires the FCC to consider, when determining whether to mandate the
unbundling of an ILEC's network elements under § 251(c)(3), "at a
minimum, whether-(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary
in nature is necessary; and (B) the failure to provide access to such network
elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking
access to provide the services that it seeks to offer." ' Together, those two
subsections are known as the "necessary" and "impair" requirements.
One cannot construe "necessary" and "impair" for purposes of
§ 251(d)(2) without first identifying the larger objective of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The statute's preamble states that its
purpose is to "promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies."47 In the legislative history, Congress reiterated that the
objectives of the Telecommunications Act are "to provide for a
pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to
accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications
and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition."4
43. If the entrant and the ILEC cannot negotiate mutually acceptable terms of
interconnection, resale, or unbundling, then the Telecommunications Act directs the state PUC to
resolve the dispute through compulsory arbitration. See id § 252(b). By the fall of 1996. entrants
and ILECs were unable to reach any voluntary agreements on the pricing of resale and unbundled
network elements. As a consequence, hundreds of arbitration proceedings began in the fall of
1996. In most cases, each arbitration was a one-on-one proceeding between a single entrant and
the ILEC.
44. See id § 251(f).
45. Section 251(c)(3) provides that ".[iln addition to the duties contained in subsection
[25 1(b)], each incumbent local exchange carrier" has certain other duties, including:
(3) Unbundled access.-The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications
carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to
network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates,
terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and
section 252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine
such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.
Id. § 251(c)(3).
46. IM § 251(d)(2).
47. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl.. I 10 Stat. 56. 56.
48. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996).
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By the plain language of § 25 1(c)(3), the "necessary" standard applies
only to "such network elements as are proprietary in nature.", 49 But neither
§ 251 (d)(2) nor any other section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
defines "proprietary" for purposes of the ILEC's duty to unbundle network
elements. In practice, the "necessary" standard of § 251(d)(2) may
ultimately prove to have less frequent application than the "impair"
standard if, under whatever legal definition is adopted, an ILEC is deemed
to have few or no network elements that are "proprietary in nature." One
way to view the "necessary" standard is that the "impairment" standard
sets necessary but not sufficient conditions for the mandatory unbundling of
an element that is "proprietary in nature."
C. The FCC's Interpretation of the Act's "Necessary" and "Impair"
Requirements
The FCC issued its Local Competition First Report and Order in
August 1996, a 683-page directive that established pricing rules that the
agency expected the states to follow and that provided definitions of
"proprietary," "necessary," and "impair." 50 The FCC concluded that
proprietary network elements include those "elements with proprietary
protocols or elements containing proprietary information." 5 The FCC defined
a network element to be "necessary" when it is "a prerequisite for
competition."' 2 The agency ruled that "in some instances, it will be
'necessary' for requesting carriers to obtain access to proprietary elements
(e.g., elements with proprietary protocols or elements containing proprietary
information), because without such elements their ability to compete would be
significantly impaired or thwarted."53 The FCC continued by contending that
"[r]equiring new entrants to duplicate unnecessarily even a part of the
incumbent's network could generate delay and higher costs for new entrants,
and thereby impede entry by competing local providers and delay competition,
contrary to the goals of the 1996 Act." 54 The FCC noted that ILECs "have
economies of density, connectivity, and scale" that must "be shared with
entrants."55 Finally, the FCC relied on a literal dictionary definition of
"impair," contending that it "means 'to make or cause to become worse;
49. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(2)(A).
50. First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996).
51. Id. 1 282. An ILEC's signaling protocols that adhere to Bellcore standards, however, were




55. Id. 11 .
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diminish in value."'' 5 6 The FCC further ruled that "generally... an
entrant's ability to offer a telecommunications service is 'diminished in
value' if the quality of the service the entrant can offer, absent access to the
requested element, declines and/or the cost of providing the service rises." 57
To effectuate its statutory interpretation of "necessary" and "impair," the
FCC ordered in Rule 319 that an ILEC make seven UNEs available to a
requesting telecommunications carrier: local loops, network interface devices
(NIDs), local switching, interoffice transmission facilities, signaling networks
and call-related databases, operations support systems (OSS), and operator
services (OS) and directory assistance (DA).5s
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Rule 319
as a reasonable agency interpretation, under the Chevron doctrine,59 of the
"necessary" and "impair" standards of § 251 (d)(2).60 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on that and other questions.6'
Il. THE SUPREME COURT ON "NECESSARY" AND "IMPAIR"
Nearly three years after Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act,
the Supreme Court, in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,62 struck down as
arbitrary and capricious Rule 319's implementation of the network element
unbundling provisions contained in § 251(c)(3). 63 The FCC's 1996 order
announced, among other things, the minimum list of network elements that
incumbent local exchange carriers must offer to other telecommunications
carriers on an unbundled basis pursuant to the newly enacted § 251 (c)(3) and
§ 251(d)(2). Specifically, the Court directed the FCC, on remand, to
"determine on a rational basis which network elements must be made
available, taking into account the objectives of the Act and giving some
substance to the 'necessary' and 'impair' requirements." 64
56. Id 1285 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTnONARY 665 (rev. ed. 1984)).
57. Id. 285.
58. See id. 1366 (to have been codified at 47 C.F.R. § 51.319).
59. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(giving "controlling weight" to regulations devised by agencies pursuant to a congressional grant
of authority "unless they are arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute"). See
generally STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 256-57 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining Chevron).
60. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753.810-12 (8th Cir. 1997). re,'d in part and aff'd
in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.. 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
61. See FCC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 683 (1998). The other grounds for appeal included
the fact that state PUCs, and not the FCC, had jurisdiction to promulgate these rules, and that the
substantive pricing standards that the FCC had adopted were so low as to effect an uncompensated
taking of the property of ILECs in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
62. 119 S. Ct. 721.
63. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(3) (West Supp. 1999). The Court. however. affirmed other
aspects of the First Report and Order, including provisions relating to the pricing of unbundled
network elements. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 732-33.
64. Iowa Utils. Bd, 119 S. Ct. at 736.
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A. Justice Scalia's Opinion for the Court
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia regarded the unbundling provisions
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as reflecting Congress's belief that
local telephony is not a "natural monopoly," and that "[technological
advances... have made competition among multiple providers of local
service seem possible." 6' But from that congressional concem, Justice Scalia
reasoned, it did not follow that the Telecommunications Act gave the FCC
unlimited authority to compel ILECs to share their facilities with competitors.
Justice Scalia observed that § 251 (d)(2) imposes "clear limits" on the
FCC's authority to determine whether an ILEC must unbundle a particular
network element pursuant to § 251(c)(3), and that Rule 319 exceeded the
bounds of those clear limits.' Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that "the FCC
did not adequately consider the 'necessary and impair' standards when it gave
blanket access to these network elements, and others, in Rule 3 19. "67
The Court considered, but did not rule on, the relevance of the essential
facilities doctrine in antitrust law as a limiting principle for the FCC's correct
interpretation of the "necessary" and "impair" standards. Justice Scalia
wrote:
The incumbents argue that § 251(d)(2) codifies something akin to
the "essential facilities" doctrine of antitrust theory, opening up
only those "bottleneck" elements unavailable elsewhere in the
marketplace. We need not decide whether, as a matter of law, the
1996 Act requires the FCC to apply that standard; it may be that
some other standard would provide an equivalent or better criterion
for the limitation upon network-element availability that the statute
has in mind. But we do agree with the incumbents that the Act
requires the FCC to apply some limiting standard, rationally related
to the goals of the Act, which it has simply failed to do.68
The Court found that Rule 319 lacked such a limiting principle, either with
respect to "necessary" or "impair."
With respect to "necessary," Justice Scalia observed that "the
Commission announced that it would regard the 'necessary' standards as
having been met regardless of whether 'requesting carriers can obtain the
requested proprietary element from a source other than the incumbent.'
69
Justice Scalia did not pause to elaborate on the fallacy of the FCC's reasoning.
65. Id. at 726.
66. Id. at 738.
67. Id. at 734.
68. Id. at 734-35 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 735 (quoting First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, T 283 (1996)).
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Rather, he immediately proceeded to explain why, with respect to "impair," it
was erroneous for the FCC to
regard the "impairment" standard as having been met if "the
failure of an incumbent to provide access to a network element
would decrease the quality, or increase the financial or
administrative cost of the service a requesting carrier seeks to offer,
compared with providing that service over other unbundled
elements in the incumbent LEC's nenvork," -which means that
comparison with self-provision, or with purchasing from another
provider, is excluded.7"
In the Court's assessment, the FCC had created a tautology: "Since any
entrant will request the most efficient network element that the incumbent
has to offer, it is hard to imagine when the incumbent's failure to give
access to the element would not constitute an 'impairment' under this
standard."'" Moreover, in the process, the FCC had assigned to potential
entrants the critical determination that Congress had delegated to the
agency through its enactment of § 251 (d)(2):
The Commission asserts that it deliberately limited its inquiry to the
incumbent's own network because no rational entrant would seek
access to network elements from an incumbent if it could get better
service or prices elsewhere. That may be. But that judgment allows
entrants, rather than the Commission, to determine whether access
to proprietary elements is necessary, and whether the failure to
obtain access to nonproprietary elements would impair the ability
to provide services.7"
In seeking to implement the unbundling provisions of the 1996 legislation, the
FCC had created a process that would, in effect, be controlled by the access
seekers themselves.
The Court also criticized, on two grounds, the economic reasoning
underlying the FCC's interpretation of "necessary" and "impair." Those
two errors of economic logic translated into two reversible legal errors in
the agency's interpretation of § 251(d)(2). First, the FCC had ignored the
relevance of supply substitutability. The Court found that, in determining
the list of elements that ILECs must provide on an unbundled basis
pursuant to §251(c)(3) and §251(d)(2), the FCC must consider the
availability of network elements outside the incumbent's network: "The
Commission cannot, consistent with the statute, blind itself to the
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availability of elements outside the incumbent's network. That failing alone
would require the Commission's rule to be set aside."
73
Second, Justice Scalia emphasized that the "impairment" standards must
embody some threshold of materiality. Otherwise, "impairment" could be
said to result from the slightest difference between what the ILEC implicitly
paid itself for use of a particular network element and what the requesting
carrier would pay for it as a UNE. "Impairment" similarly could be said to
result from any difference in the quality of the network element:
[T]he Commission's assumption that any increase in cost (or
decrease in quality) imposed by denial of a network element
renders access to that element "necessary," and causes the failure
to provide that element to "impair" the entrant's ability to furnish
its desired services is simply not in accord with the ordinary and
fair meaning of those terms. An entrant whose anticipated annual
profits from the proposed service are reduced from 100% of
investment to 99% of investment has perhaps been "impaired" in
its ability to amass earnings, but has not ipso facto been
"impair[ed] ... in its ability to provide the services it seeks to
offer"; and it cannot realistically be said that the network element
enabling it to raise its profits to 100% is "necessary."
In articulating that legal and economic reasoning for the Court, Justice Scalia
responded to Justice Souter's dissent, which argued that the common usage of
the words "necessary" and "impair" made Rule 319 a reasonable agency
interpretation of § 251 (d)(2) to which the Court should defer under Chevron."
Justice Scalia's response to Justice Souter made two important points, one
concerning an incumbent's cost advantage over entrants, and the other
concerning whether an entrant was entitled to expect anything more than a
reasonable opportunity to earn a competitive return:
Justice Souter points out that one can say his ability to replace a
light bulb is "impaired" by the absence of a ladder, and that a
ladder is "necessary" to replace the bulb, even though one "could
stand instead on a chair, a milk can, or eight volumes of Gibbon."
True enough (and nicely put), but the proper analogy here, it seems
to us, is not the absence of a ladder, but the presence of a ladder tall
enough to enable one to do the job, but not without stretching one's
arm to its full extension. A ladder one-half inch taller is not,
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 739 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"within an ordinary and fair meaning of the word," "necessary,"
nor does its absence "impair" one's ability to do the job.76
Justice Scalia also emphasized that the statutory right of competing
telecommunications carriers to receive unbundled access to an ILEC's
network element under the "impairment" standards was not a guarantee to
the carrier of supracompetitive profits: "We similarly disagree with Justice
Souter that a business can be impaired in its ability to provide services-
even impaired in that ability 'in an ordinary, weak sense of impairment'-
when the business receives a handsome profit but is denied an even
handsomer one."77 Stated differently, Justice Scalia reasoned that, if a
telecommunications carrier does not need to lease a particular UNE to earn a
normal economic profit after entering a particular market, then that carrier
cannot claim to have been "impaired" in its ability to supply
telecommunications services to consumers simply because its lease of the
UNE in question might have enabled the carrier to earn a supracompetitive
profit. Consistent with the view that the unbundling rules exist to enhance
consumer welfare rather than competitor welfare, Justice Scalia seemed to say
that a CLEC could have at most a legally cognizable claim under the
"necessary" and "impair" standards only if it would be denied, by an ILEC's
refusal to offer the desired UNE, a reasonable opportunity to earn a
competitive return on capital, or what is called zero economic profit.7' The
mandatory unbundling provisions of § 251 (d)(2) do not grant an entrant any
right to earn a supracompetitive return, or what is called economic rent.79 "In a
world of perfect competition," wrote Justice Scalia, "in which all carriers are
providing their service at marginal cost, the Commission's total equating of
increased cost (or decreased quality) with 'necessity' and 'impairment' might
be reasonable; but it has not established the existence of such an ideal
world." s0 Justice Scalia saw no statutory basis for the distortions that Rule 319
would create in an imperfect world-let alone the distortions that the FCC
would create by ensuring that entrants would earn windfall profits if they
chose to lease, at a TELRIC price, any network element for which the FCC
had found it to be technically feasible to order mandatory unbundling.
76. Id. at 735 n.Il (quoting id. at 739 (Souter, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in pat))
(citation omitted).
77. Id. (quoting id. at 740 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (citation
omitted).
78. "Economic profits are zero when total revenues equal total costs, inclusive of a
competitive return on capital." SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 4. at 313.
79. Economic rent is a return to a factor of production in excess of the payment that is
necessary to prevent that factor from being redeployed to an alternative use. See, e.g.. PAUL
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, EcONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENi" 269 (1992);
Armen A. Alchian, Rent, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 141 (John
EatweU et al. eds., 1987).
80. Iowa Utils. Ba., 119 S. C. at 735.
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The Court found that the FCC's interpretations of "necessary" and
"impair" produced a more invasive approach to mandatory network
unbundling than the Court believed Congress possibly could have intended:
We cannot avoid the conclusion that, if Congress had wanted to
give blanket access to incumbents' networks on a basis as
unrestricted as the scheme the Commission has come up with, it
would not have included § 251 (d)(2) in the statute at all. It would
simply have said (as the Commission in effect has) that whatever
requested element can be provided must be provided.8
The Court traced that error in the FCC's statutory interpretation to the
agency's conclusion that it would impair entry for the ILEC to fail to
unbundle every network element for which unbundling was technically
feasible:
The FCC was content with its expansive methodology because of
its misunderstanding of § 251 (c)(3), which directs an incumbent to
allow a requesting carrier access to its network elements "at any
technically feasible point." The Commission interpreted this to
"impos[e] on an incumbent LEC the duty to provide all network
elements for which it is technically feasible to provide access," and
went on to "conclude that we have authority to establish
regulations that are coextensive" with this duty.
82
Justice Scalia observed that this interpretation was "undoubtedly wrong," as
the Eighth Circuit had held.83 Quoting the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Court
emphasized that § 251(c)(3) "indicates 'where unbundled access must occur,
not which [network] elements must be unbundled."' 84 The FCC, however,
adopted a contrary interpretation in its Local Competition First Report and
Order. "The Commission began with the premise that an incumbent was
obliged to turn over as much of its network as was 'technically feasible,' and
viewed [§ 251(d)(2)] as merely permitting it to soften that obligation by
regulatory grace. ..
81. Id.
82. Id. at 736 (quoting First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, I1 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 278 (1996) (emphasis
added by the Court)); see also id. (" [W]e conclude that the statute does not require us to interpret
the 'impairment' standard in a way that would significantly diminish the obligation imposed by
section 251(c)(3)." (quoting First Report and Order, II F.C.C.R. 286)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d at 810 (emphasis added by the Court)).
85. Id. (citation omitted). As evidence of that erroneous premise, Justice Scalia quoted the
following language from the Local Competition First Report and Order: "To give effect to both
sections 251(c)(3) and 251(d)(2), we conclude that the proprietary and impairment standards in
section 251(d)(2) grant us the authority to refrain from requiring incumbent LECs to provide all
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The Court ruled that the FCC's "premise was wrong" and that
§ 251(d)(2) "does not authorize the Commission to create isolated exemptions
from some underlying duty to make all network elements available." " Far
from intending the FCC's discretionary dispensation of "regulatory grace,"
§ 251(d)(2)
requires the Commission to determine on a rational basis which
network elements must be made available, taking into account the
objectives of the Act and giving some substance to the "necessary"
and "impair" requirements. The latter is not achieved by
disregarding entirely the availability of elements outside the
network, and by regarding any "increased cost or decreased service
quality" as establishing a "necessity" and an "impair[ment]" of
the ability to "provide ... services." '
In short, the Court held that the FCC's interpretation of "necessary" and
"impair" must reflect the procompetitive goals of the 1996 legislation, that
the interpretation must embody an assessment of competitive substitution in
the supply of network elements, and that the interpretation must not trigger
mandatory unbundling of network elements on the basis of insignificant
differences between the cost or service quality of the network elements
used by the ILEC and the cost or service quality of the network elements
that the ILEC supplies an entrant.
B. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board that
concurred with the Court's holding on the "necessary" and "impair"
standards.s Unlike Justice Scalia, whose opinion for the Court confined
itself to interpretation of statutory text, Justice Breyer began with the
premise that the "statute's history and purpose can illuminate its
language." 9 Accordingly, Justice Breyer read the "necessary" and
"impair" requirements not only "in light of history, purpose, and
network elements for which it is technically feasible to provide access on an unbundled basis." Id.
(quoting First Report and Order, I I F.C.C.R. j 279).
86. Id
87. Id Justice Thomas concurred with this part of the Court's decision but wrote a separate
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer, which dissented from other parts of
the Court's decision that are not pertinent to our discussion. See id. at 741-46 (Thomas, I..
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id at 746-54 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Much of Justice
Breyer's opinion was devoted to his dissent from the Court's holding concerning the FCC's
jurisdiction to promulgate pricing rules that were binding on the states.
89. Id. at 746. For historical analysis, Justice Breyer relied upon Justice Thomas's opinion.
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precedent," 9 but also in light of scholarly research on the law and
economics of regulation and antitrust jurisprudence.91
1. The Purpose of the Telecommunications Act
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer presented the litigation over
unbundling and UNE pricing as the current act of a long drama,
commencing with the divestiture of AT&T. The federal government had
used the prospect of lifting the regulatory quarantine on RBOCs entering
interLATA markets to induce the RBOCs to open their local exchange
markets to competitive entry-by, among other possible firms, the IXCs9
Justice Breyer acknowledged that the government's use of a barrier to entry
into one market as a lever to promote entry into another market created
costs--diminished interLATA competition-that had to be balanced
against the perceived benefits of stimulating competition in local telephony.
In the Telecommunications Act, he observed, Congress codified its
judgment concerning the proper tradeoff between competitive benefits and
costs.
93
To advance toward competition in local telephony, Justice Breyer
observed that the 1996 legislation poses, but "does not purport to answer,"
an empirical question: "To what extent is local competition possible
without wasteful duplication of facilities?" 94 The Telecommunications Act
"creates a set of legal rules," including unbundling rules, "which, through
interaction with the marketplace, aims to produce sensible answers.""
Justice Breyer summarized Congress's logic in enacting the local
competition and long-distance provisions of the Telecommunications Act as
follows:
[O]ne can understand the basic logic of "unbundling" by
imagining that Congress required a sole incumbent railroad
providing service between City A and City B to share certain basic
facilities, say, bridges, rights-of-way, or tracks, in order to avoid
wasteful duplication of those hard-to-duplicate resources while
facilitating competition in the remaining aspects of A-to-B railroad
service. Indeed, one might characterize the Act's basic purpose as
seeking to bring about, without inordinate waste, greater local
service competition both as an end in local markets and as a means
90. Id.
91. Justice Breyer. of course, has made his own contributions to that scholarly literature. See.
e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); Breyer, supra note 9.
92. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 746-47 (Breyer. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
93. See id. at 747.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251(c)(2)-(4). 253(a) (West Supp. 1999)).
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towards more competition, and fair competition, in long-distance
markets.
96
Justice Breyer believed that " [t]hose purposes neither require nor suggest
reading the Act's language to change radically the scope of local regulators'
traditional rate-setting powers." 97 His basis for that view has equal
applicability to the "necessary" and "impair" standards of § 251 (d)(2), an
issue on which Justice Breyer concurred with six other Justices?
The introduction of competition into a particular locality does not
diminish the importance of place-specific factors, such as local
history, geography, demands, and costs. And local regulators are
likely more familiar than are national regulators, for example, with
a particular utility's physical plant, its cost structure, the pattern of
local demand, the history of local investment, and the need for
recovery of undepreciated fixed costs.
Moreover, local regulators have experience setting rates that
recover both the immediate, smaller, added costs that demand for
additional service imposes upon a local system and also a proper
share of the often huge fixed costs (of local loops, say, or switches)
and overhead needed to provide the dial tone itself. Indeed, local
regulators would seem as likely, if not more likely, than national
regulators to know whether, when, or the extent to which, particular
local charges or systems of charges will lead new entrants to
abandon efforts to use a local incumbent's elements, turning instead
to alternative technologies. And local regulators would seem as
likely as national regulators to know whether or when use of such
alternative technologies in the local circumstances will prove more
beneficial than wasteful. It is the local communities, and, hence,
local regulators, that will directly confront the problems and enjoy
the benefits associated with local efforts to integrate new and old
communications resources and communications firms.99
As we shall explain in Section VII.B, this insight concerning the unique
competence of state regulators in evaluating the competitive and regulatory
aspects of local telecommunications markets has special relevance to the
FCC's 1999 proposal in the Second Further Proposed Notice of
Rulemaking to preempt state participation in the interpretation and
administration of § 251(d)(2) by announcing, on a nationwide basis, that
certain unbundled network elements are deemed to meet the "necessary"
and "impair" requirements.
96. I& at 748.
97. Id.
98. Justice O'Connor did not participate in the case. See id. at 721.
99. Id.
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2. The FCC's Pricing Rules for Unbundled Network Elements
Much of Justice Breyer's separate opinion addressed his disagreement
with the majority over whether the Telecommunications Act gave the FCC
the authority to preempt state rate-setting for unbundled network elements.
Although most of that analysis is not directly relevant to interpreting the
"necessary" and "impair" requirements, some portions unquestionably are.
In particular, Justice Breyer emphasized that, "when faced with ambiguity"
in a regulatory statute that envisions federal and state cooperation, the Court
is "to interpret statutes... on the assumption that Congress intended to
preserve local authority." '0 Justice Breyer observed that the "dozens of
pages of text that set... forth" the FCC's pricing rules for unbundled
network elements were "highly specific and highly detailed." "' Their
effect was to deny any discretion to state regulators:
[The FCC's pricing rules] deprive state commissions of
methodological leeway. Their rate-setting instructions grant a state
commission little or no freedom to choose among reasonable rate-
determining methods according to the State's policy-related
judgments, assessing local economic circumstance or community
need. I grant the fact that the rules leave it to the state commissions
to fix the actual rate, but that is rather like giving a restaurant chef
the authority to choose a menu while restricting him to one dish, an
omelette, and to one single favorite recipe.'0°
Furthermore, Justice Breyer noted, the Telecommunications Act did not
compel the pricing rule that the FCC imposed on the states." 3 He regarded
the FCC's vision of competition as misguided: "The competition that the
Act seeks is a process, not an end result; and a regulatory system that
imposes through administrative mandate a set of prices that tries to mimic
those that competition would have set does not thereby become any the less
a regulatory process, nor any the more a competitive one." '" As we shall
explain in Part IV, this misconception of competition directly affects the
FCC's interpretation of the "necessary" and "impair" standards as well.
In the context of UNE pricing, Justice Breyer intimated that the FCC's
strategy in preempting the states from developing their own pricing rules
was to foreclose other reasonable interpretations of the statute without
100. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 749-50 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
101. Id. at 751 (citing First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, I1 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 1 672-715 (1996)).
102. Id.
103. See id. ("Nor can the FCC successfully argue that the Act requires the particular rate-




having to supply an intellectually respectable justification for that
exclusion: "Most importantly, the FCC's rules embody not an effort to
circumscribe the realm of the reasonable, but rather a policy-oriented effort
to choose among several different systems, including systems based upon
actual costs or price caps, which other systems the FCC's rules prohibit." 10
Those alternative pricing rules, prohibited by the FCC, "illustrate... how
easily a regulator weighing certain policy considerations (for example
administrative considerations) differently might have chosen a different set
of reasonable rules."'' " One could imagine state regulators similarly
adopting conclusions about "necessity" and "impairment" that differ
reasonably from the FCC's conclusions.
3. The "Necessary" and "Impair" Requirements
Justice Breyer concurred in the Court's holding with respect to the
FCC's interpretation of the "necessary" and "impair" requirements of
§ 251(d)(2). In writing separately on this part of the Court's decision, he
employed economic analysis that complemented the textual analysis of
Justice Scalia's majority opinion.
Justice Breyer began by noting that the Telecommunications Act
expresses the unbundling obligations of ILECs " in general terms, reflecting
congressional uncertainty about the extent to which compelled use of an
incumbent's facilities will prove necessary to avoid waste.'" He then
anticipated the question, which we address in Part IV, that goes to the heart
of the issue confronting the FCC on remand: "Will wireless technology or
cable television lines, for example, permit the efficient provision of local
telephone service without the use of existing telephone lines that now run
house to house?" 10 Such substitution at the end-user level has the potential,
over the near term in some geographic markets, to render mandatory
unbundling of even residential local loops unnecessary and inappropriate.
Justice Breyer found the "reasonably clear" objective of § 251 (d)(2) to
be "to facilitate the introduction of competition where practical, i.e.,
105. Id.
106. ld at 752. With respect to the "the FCC's decision to prohibit use" of the efficient
component-pricing rule (ECPR), Justice Breyer noted: "The FCC rejected that [ECPR] system.
but in doing so it did not claim, nor did its reasoning support the claim, that the use of such a
system would be arbitrary or unreasonable." Id. Of "the FCC's decision to forbid the use" of
Ramsey pricing, Justice Breyer wrote: "Many experts strongly prefer the use of such a system
[and some argue] that the FCC's prohibition of Ramsey pricing will 'minimize rather than
maximize consumer welfare.' The FCC disfavors Ramsey pricing, but it does not explain why a
contrary judgment would conflict with the statute or otherwise be arbitrary or unreasonable." Id
(quoting Sidak & Spulber, supra note 4, at 1109, and citing I ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONoMtcs
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without inordinate waste." '09 That objective, he reasoned, required
§ 251(d)(2) to function like the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust law:
[A]lthough the provision describing which elements must be
unbundled does not explicitly refer to the analogous "essential
facilities" doctrine (an antitrust doctrine that this Court has never
adopted), the Act, in my view, does impose related limits upon the
FCC's power to compel unbundling. In particular, I believe that,
given the Act's basic purpose, it requires a convincing explanation
of why facilities should be shared (or "unbundled") where a new
entrant could compete effectively without the facility, or where
practical alternatives to that facility are available. "0
Justice Breyer noted that Justice Scalia reached this insight by textual
analysis." 1 The great utility of Justice Breyer's concurrence on the
unbundling rules is that he went beyond the majority's textual analysis to
suggest that the kind of consumer welfare analysis that a court routinely
conducts in an antitrust case also would yield the same answer:
Section 251 (d)(2) must be implicitly limited by a principle that resembles
the essential facilities doctrine.
Justice Breyer emphasized that, in multiple respects, unbundling is not
costless to private firms, consumers, or regulators:
The fact that compulsory sharing can have significant
administrative and social costs inconsistent with the Act's purposes
suggests [that a limiting principle implicitly exists.] Even the
simplest kind of compelled sharing, say, requiring a railroad to
share bridges, tunnels, or track, means that someone must oversee
the terms and conditions of that sharing. Moreover, a sharing
requirement may diminish the original owner's incentive to keep up
or to improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of
value-creating investment, research, or labor.' 2
Furthermore, Justice Breyer warned that the complexity and cost of
mandatory unbundling multiply as the network elements in question
become more technologically sophisticated and as product or process
innovation becomes a more significant dimension over which firms
compete in the provision of end services:
And as one moves beyond the sharing of readily separable and
administrable physical facilities, say, to the sharing of research
109. Id.
110. Id.




facilities, firm management, or technical capacities, these problems
can become more severe. One would not ordinarily believe it
practical, for example, to require a railroad to share its locomotives,
fuel, or workforce. Nor can one guarantee that firms will undertake
the investment necessary to produce complex technological
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from
those innovations will be dissipated by the sharing requirement.
The more complex the facilities, the more central their relation to
the firm's managerial responsibilities, the more extensive the
sharing demanded, the more likely these costs will become
serious.... And the more serious they become, the more likely
they will offset any economic or competitive gain that a sharing
requirement might otherwise provide. The greater the
administrative burden, for example, the more the need for complex
proceedings, the very existence of which means delay, which in
turn can impede the entry into long-distance markets that the Act
foresees. "3
We examine these costs of mandatory unbundling in detail in Part IV.
Justice Breyer found further need for a limiting principle by examining
the kinds of competition that would and would not emerge from mandatory
unbundling:
Nor are any added costs imposed by more extensive unbundling
requirements necessarily offset by the added potential for
competition. Increased sharing by itself does not automatically
mean increased competition. It is in the unshared, not in the shared,
portions of the enterprise that meaningful competition would likely
emerge. Rules that force firms to share every resource or element of
a business would create, not competition, but pervasive regulation,
for the regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant
terms.
114
Justice Breyer therefore reasons that § 251(d)(2) requires balancing
expected benefits and costs."5 According to Justice Breyer, "Regulatory
rules that go too far, expanding the definition of what must be shared
beyond that which is essential to that which merely proves advantageous to
a single competitor, risk costs that, in terms of the Act's objectives, may
make the game not worth the candle." 16 If Congress had intended through
113. M. at 753-54 (citing 1 HAROLD DEMSETZ,. OWNERSHIP. CON'TROL. AND THE FIRM: THE
ORGANIZATION OF EcONOMIc AcTIVITY 207 (1988)).
114. Id. at 754.
115. See i Justice Breyer's conclusion is consistent with his broader view that regulation
should be subjected to rigorous cost-benefit analysis. See generally STEPHEN BREYER. BREAKING
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
116. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 754 (Breyer, . concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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its enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that "an incumbent
should be forced to share virtually every aspect of its business," asked Justice
Breyer, "would Congress have seen a need for a separate wholesale sales
requirement (since the 'unbundling' requirement would have led to a similar
result)? Indeed, would Congress have so emphasized the importance of
competition?" 117 Justice Breyer concluded that the FCC's vision of the
optimal level of unbundling-" the more the incumbent unbundles, the
better"' 1 8 -would create nothing more than a Potemkin village of
competition: "A totally unbundled world-a world in which competitors
share every part of an incumbent's existing system, including, say, billing,
advertising, sales staff, and work force (and in which regulators set all
unbundling charges)-is a world in which competitors would have little, if
anything, to compete about." 19
C. Justice Souter's Dissent
In a separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board, Justice Souter concurred in
the Court's holding that the FCC had jurisdiction to set UNE pricing rules that
bound the states, but he dissented from the Court's holding that the FCC
unreasonably interpreted the "necessary" and "impair" requirements of
§ 251(d)(2).12 1 Justice Souter's dissent is significant because, of the four
opinions by the Justices in Iowa Utilities Board,12' his most closely resembles
the reasoning contained three months later in the FCC's Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
Justice Souter predicated his analysis on the observation that "[u]nder
Chevron, the only question before us is whether the Commission's
interpretation, obviously favorable to potential competitors, falls outside the
bounds of reasonableness." 122 He conceded that Rule 319 would "probably
allow a competitor to obtain access to any network element that it wants" by
presenting at most "a weak economic justification." 123 As a matter of statutory
interpretation, however, Justice Souter considered "necessary" and "impair"
to be ambiguous words that Chevron entitled the FCC to define in any
reasonable manner, including what he described as the "weak... [butl




120. Id. at 739 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion as well. See supra note 87.
122. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 739 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 740.
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ladder-and-light-bulb example, commented upon by Justice Scalia." Unlike
Justice Breyer, Justice Souter could perceive no social costs that would offset
the perceived social benefits of greater degrees of unbundling. Justice Souter
did not recognize that his interpretation of § 251(d)(2) would place the
unbundling rules at cross-purposes with the rest of the Telecommunications
Act, as well as with the antitrust laws. Justice Souter's reasoning was rejected
by every other member of the Court participating in the Iowa Utilities Board
decision.
D. On Remand
The FCC responded to the Court's opinion by issuing in April 1999 a
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.' In this notice, the FCC
affirmed its authority to issue a national list of minimum unbundling
requirements, 27 but appeared open to suggestions on the applicability of the
"necessary" and "impair" standards to services embodying new
technologies, as well as the applicability of the essential facilities doctrine
to network unbundling.' 2s As in the case of any of the FCC's notices of
proposed rulemaking, the agency announced numerous "tentative
conclusions" concerning the network elements that might need to be
unbundled and the reasoning leading to such conclusions. We examine the
FCC's reasoning and conclusions in Part IV.
Meanwhile, as of November 1999, no BOC had received FCC
permission to provide long-distance service-although Bell Atlantic's
application to provide such service in New York, filed in October 1999,
was reported to have a chance of approval before 2000." Long-distance
companies (principally AT&T, MCI-WorldCom, and Sprint) have opposed
the prospect of increased competition in interLATA markets, and the FCC
has attempted to wring greater unbundling concessions out of the BOCs.
This stalemate, much like the MFJ, has harmed consumers, and the United
States continues as the only developed country where (most) local
telephone companies are not permitted to compete for long-distance traffic.
125. IfI want to replace a light bulb, I would be within an ordinary and fair meaning of
the word "necessary" to say that a stepladder is "'necessary" to install the bulb, even
though I could stand instead on a chair, a milk can, or eight volumes of Gibbon. I
could just as easily say that the want of a ladder would - impair" my ability to install
the bulb under the same circumstances.
Id. at 739. For Justice Scalia's comments, see supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
126. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. supra note 3.
127. Id. 14.
128. See id 16-23.
129. See Steve Rosenbush, A Boom for the Baby Bells?. BUS. WK.. Nov. 1. 1999, at 47.
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IV. WHY LIMITING PRINCIPLES ARE NEEDED
In this Part, we will use economic analysis to identify the
interpretations of the "necessary" and "impair" standards that best meet
the goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Foremost among those
limiting principles is the proposition that the FCC's unbundling rules
should regard the public interest as primarily determined by consumer
welfare, which is advanced by competition rather than by the protection
of any particular competitor's interests. Thus, whether it is "necessary"
for the FCC to mandate, at TELRIC prices, the unbundling of a
particular proprietary network element in a particular location at a
particular time should depend on whether such unbundling is necessary
to permit the competitive supply of telecommunications services to end
users. Similarly, the correct meaning of "impair" for purposes of
§ 251(d)(2) is whether the ILEC's failure to unbundle, at TELRIC prices, a
particular nonproprietary network element would produce an equilibrium
supply of telecommunications services that would be, relative to the
competitive equilibrium, significantly inferior for consumers. Here,
"inferior" can mean not only higher prices, but also lower quality services
or less innovation in new telecommunications services. The consumer
welfare losses from such inferiority have been shown empirically to be
enormous.
130
A. Consumer Welfare: Competition Rather than Competitor Protection
The definitions of "necessary" and "impair" should seek to further
overall competition and not merely the economic interests of individual
competitors. In its Local Competition First Report and Order, the
Commission failed to make that distinction, one well-recognized in antitrust
law. Unfortunately, the FCC's 1999 Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking repeats that error.
1. The Goal of the Telecommunications Act
Consumers benefit from competition because it leads to greater
innovation and lower prices. Thus, the public interest is consistent with
increased competition and innovation. However, the public-interest
standard, although central to interpretation of telecommunications
regulation, has not always received so precise a definition. Three years
before the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Professor
William J. Baumol and one of the present authors wrote:
130. See Hausman, supra note 12.
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[W]e will use the phrase "the public interest" more precisely and
restrictively than do the Communications Act, the FCC, and the
state public utility commissions. It will connote economic
efficiency, or the maximization of the general welfare of consumers
and producers-that is, the maximization of the sum of consumers'
surplus and producers' surplus. Often this criterion is referred to in
the abbreviated form "consumer welfare maximization." 3'
The primacy that economists ascribe to economic efficiency and to the
maximization of consumer welfare has a related benefit: It harmonizes
economic regulation and antitrust law. For in the latter, the Supreme Court
has contributed a muscular jurisprudence asserting that the first goal of the
Sherman Act and other federal antitrust statutes is to be a "consumer
welfare prescription." '32 This harmony between regulation and antitrust has
three important implications. First, the same basic tools of microeconomic
analysis can be employed in one as in the other. There can be little
disagreement that the economic sophistication of antitrust law has enriched
the regulatory analysis of natural monopolies. Second, changes in
technology or other circumstances that permit a natural monopoly to give
way to competition impart continuity to the relationship between economic
regulation and antitrust. Third, many of the thorniest problems in antitrust
law-such as judicial enforcement of injunctive remedies or the essential
facilities doctrine-are fundamentally regulatory in nature, involving issues
such as entry or the pricing of intermediate goods sold to competitors. Thus,
the economic scholarship on regulation can in many instances enrich
antitrust jurisprudence. '33
In 1996, Congress endorsed this view when, as noted earlier, it
emphasized in the Telecommunications Act that the improvement of
consumer welfare was the new legislation's overarching purpose.
2. Iowa Utilities Board
A standard that looks to the effect on competition, rather than the
interests of a given CLEC, comports with the Supreme Court's command
that the Commission must take into account the availability of substitutes
for ILEC network elements outside the ILEC's network. If substitutes
outside the ILEC's network are available, that availability occurs because
some firms have made the rational economic decision that they can
efficiently provide services that employ those non-ILEC elements.
131. BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 11, at 26.
132. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.. 442
U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
133. See BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 11, at 26-27.
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Two conclusions necessarily follow. First, the element as provided by
the ILEC cannot be essential for competition because competition is already
occurring without ILEC provision. Thus, the network element, unbundled
by government decree at TELRIC prices, cannot be labeled an essential
facility, or "necessary" for competition, or an element for which the
decision not to mandate unbundling at a TELRIC price would "impair" the
competitive supply of telecommunications services. "Increased sharing,"
observed Justice Breyer, "by itself does not automatically mean increased
competition." '3
Second, competition will not be adversely affected if a given CLEC
cannot procure the unbundled element from the ILEC. Other firms are
providing substitutes outside the ILEC's network, and so, in the absence of
diminishing returns to scale, increased demand for the element outside the
ILEC's network can be met at the same or lower economic cost. We would
find diminishing returns to scale if a scarce input, which could not be
reproduced, were present-fertile land is a good example. But in
telecommunications those scarce inputs do not exist; in fact, the
Commission itself states that increasing returns to scale are expected. 3'
Therefore, the limiting principle sought by the Court emerges naturally
from its analysis of substitutability. Although the Court did not explicitly
endorse our consumer-welfare maximization principle, the Court's analysis
clearly points in that direction.
3. Consumer Welfare in Antitrust Jurisprudence
Like the Telecommunications Act, modern antitrust law looks to
consumer welfare as its guiding principle. Several respected jurists have
elaborated this point. For example, Chief Judge Posner has repeatedly
emphasized that consumer welfare is the guiding light of antitrust law,
stressing that " [c]ompetition is the allocation of resources in which economic
welfare (consumer welfare, to oversimplify slightly) is maximized; it is not
rivalry per se, or a particular form of rivalry, or some minimum number of
competitors." 136 In a 1983 antitrust decision, he stated:
[T]hough there is a sense in which the exclusion of any competitor
reduces competition, it is not the sense of competition that is
relevant to antitrust law. The policy of competition is designed for
the ultimate benefit of consumers rather than of individual
134. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 754 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
135. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability
to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, app. 13 (1999).
136. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Product
Liab. Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663-65 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.)).
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competitors, and a consumer has no interest in the preservation of a
fixed number of competitors greater than the number required to
assure his being able to buy at the competitive price. Maybe the
older, competitor-protection view would survive in a case of naked
aggression resulting in the total exclusion of a competitor from the
market, but that would be a per se case (if anything) and this is
not.
137
Similarly, Justice (then Judge) Breyer wrote for the F-st Circuit in 1987:
"'Anticompetitive' [in antitrust law] has a special meaning: it refers not to
actions that merely injure individual competitors, but rather to actions that
harm the competitive process, a process that aims to bring consumers the
benefits of lower prices, better products, and more efficient production
methods." 131
The Supreme Court has repeatedly embraced such reasoning. In 1993,
for example, the Court stated in Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan:
39
The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from
the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure
of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is
competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly
tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out of solicitude
for private concerns but out of concern for the public interest."t
This principle in antitrust law follows from the Court's 1977 decision in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,141 which held that antitrust injury
is "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." 42
137. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir.
1983) (citing University Life Ins. Co. of America v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir.
1983) (Posner, J.); Products Liab., 682 F.2d at 663-64). In Products Liability, Chief Judge Posner
wrote: "The consumer does not care how many sellers of a particular good or service there are; he
cares only that there be enough to assure him a competitive price and quality." Products Liab..
682 F.2d at 664. In another antitrust decision the following year. he wrote that "competition in the
antitrust sense signifies not the preservation of all existing competitors but the maintenance of a
sufficient number to assure that consumers get the best possible quality of product at the lowest
possible price." University Life, 699 F.2d at 852 (citing Products Liab.. 682 F.2d at 663-64).
138. Interface Group v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9. 10 (1st Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted).
139. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
140. Id at 458 (citations omitted).
141. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
142. Id at 489 (emphasis omitted). For similar statements of the Court following, or
foreshadowing, the Brunsvick articulation of "antitrust injury," see Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338-39 (1990); Cargill. Inc. v. Monfort of Colo.. 479 U.S.
104, 116-17 (1986); Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters. 459
U.S. 519, 539-40 (1983); Blue Shield v. McCready. 457 U.S. 465. 483 n.19 (1982); J. Truett
Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981); and Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
B. The FCC's Failure To Advance Consumer Welfare
In its Local Competition First Report and Order, which it issued in
1996, the Commission determined that a "requesting carrier's ability to
offer service is 'impaired' ('diminished in value') if 'the quality of the
service the entrant can offer absent access to the requested element,
declines' or if 'the cost of providing the service rises.'"' "4 That impairment
standard, much like the rest of the FCC's approach to network unbundling,
reflects a competitor-based standard, not a competition-based standard.
Unfortunately, the Commission continued in 1999 to consider the
economic interests of a given CLEC rather than the effect of the
"necessary" and "impair" standards on overall competition." Indeed, the
FCC asked in its Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking whether
the "requesting carrier's particular market entry strategies should be
considered as part of the 'necessary' and 'impair' analysis." "' Moreover,
the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking took liberties in
characterizing the relevant statutory language. The FCC stated: "Section
251(d)(2)(B) requires us to consider whether the failure to provide access to
an element would 'impair' the ability of a new entrant to provide a service it
seeks to offer." 146 In fact, the statute speaks of a "telecommunications
carrier," " and it is inaccurate to characterize CLECs such as AT&T, MCI
WorldCom, and Sprint as "new entrants" in local telecommunications
markets. The Commission has yet to consider the crucial difference between
the effect on competition, which the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was
intended to create, and the economic interests of a particular competitor,
which the 1996 legislation did not attempt, and the Commission should not
attempt, to protect.
The Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking continued,
incorrectly, to impart to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 the
"older, competitor-protection view" 148--even when the FCC's statutory
interpretation of § 251(d)(2) is judged by standards of antitrust
jurisprudence dating at least to the early 1980s. To extend Chief Judge
Posner's reasoning from 1983 to the present case, the relevant analysis is
whether "either the exclusion of an individual [CLEC] from a local market
or the possible effect of that exclusion on the competitive behavior of other
143. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3. 1 6 (quoting First Report
and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, '282, 285 (1996)) (emphasis added).
144. See id. 1 20.
145. Id. 127.
146. Id. 17 (emphasis added).
147. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999).




aspirants... could result in a higher price or lower quality of [service] in
[the affected] communities." 149 The FCC's Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, however, does not propose to undertake such
analysis. Rather, it ascribes paramount importance to the supplications of
individual competitors. Thus, as Chief Judge Posner put it, "there is a
question to what extent, with their emphasis on the welfare of competitors
rather than consumers," those regulators at the FCC proposing a statutory
interpretation of § 251 (d)(2) "can survive the consumer-oriented view of
antitrust that prevails today." '50 That the business plan of any one CLEC
might not be viable unless the FCC were to order the ILEC to unbundle its
network elements at TELRIC prices "would have no appreciable effect on
competition, viewed as a state in which consumer interests are well served
rather than as a process of rivalry that is diminished by the elimination of
even one tiny rival." 151 As Chief Judge Posner concluded thirteen years
before the passage of the Telecommunications Act, "That 'there's a special
providence in the fall of a sparrow,' is not the contemporary philosophy of
antitrust." "'
The economic welfare of any single CLEC will not affect consumer
welfare, because consumer welfare depends on the overall competitive
supply of telecommunications services. If, under the Commission's
interpretation of the "necessary" and "impair" standards, any single CLEC
can claim that a given element is necessary to its business strategy, then it is
likely that all elements of the network will be subjected to mandatory
unbundling at TELRIC prices. Such a standard would harm consumers and
diminish consumer welfare. As noted earlier, Justice Breyer discussed this
outcome: "Regulatory rules that go too far, expanding the definition of
what must be shared beyond that which is essential to that which merely
proves advantageous to a single competitor, risk costs that in terms of the
Act's objectives, may make the game not worth the candle." '53
As we will explain in greater detail in Part V, the Commission can
determine whether competition will be impaired by analyzing whether
prices for telecommunications services will be higher or quality
(innovation) will be lower as a result of the agency's "necessary" and
"impair" policy. Thus, individual competitors' profits are not relevant to a
competition standard or a public interest standard.
The Supreme Court realized in Iowa Utilities Board that, in a world of
imperfect competition, cost differences that do not arise in marginal cost
149. 1&
150. Id- at 1495-96.
151. University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd.. 699 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1983).
152. Id. (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE. HAMLET. act 5. sc. 2).
153. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 754 (1999) (Breyer. J.. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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might have no effect on either competition or competitive prices. The Court
stated that "in a world of perfect competition, in which all carriers are
providing their service at marginal cost, the Commission's total equation of
increased cost (or decreased quality) with 'necessity' and 'impairment'
might be reasonable; but it has not established the existence of such an ideal
world." 154
There can be no claim that telecommunications is a world of perfect
competition given the significant fixed costs and common costs that exist. 1"
Indeed, the Commission's standard for pricing unbundled elements, which
includes the fixed costs and foresees the inclusion of a "reasonable share"
of forward-looking common costs, specifically rules out the possibility that
the Commission believes that perfect competition could occur in the local
telecommunications network.'56
Economists generally accept that with imperfect competition, prices are
set as a markup over marginal costs, subject to a breakeven constraint so
that the firm can cover its fixed and common costs. 57 Under free entry, a
sufficient number of firms enter so that firms expect to earn their normal
cost of capital (that is, they break even). But firms do not earn excess
economic profits, because new entry decreases profits to normal levels.
Prices exceed marginal costs, but only by enough to cover the fixed and
common costs and to allow the firm to earn a normal economic return on
invested capital. Thus, an imperfectly competitive outcome could lead to
the same (or even lower) prices where CLECs do not have access to a given
unbundled element from the ILEC, but instead self-supply the element or
buy it from another supplier. The expected profit of a CLEC might be
higher if the Commission required the ILEC to supply the unbundled
element. Competition, however, could be greater without the requirement
because the marginal cost to the CLEC and resulting prices to consumers
could well be lower, especially in a scenario of lumpy investment or excess
capacity. Thus, under imperfect competition, the "necessary" and "impair"
standards do not imply that competition is greatest or consumer welfare is
highest when CLEC profits are the greatest, as the Commission has
incorrectly assumed. Indeed, the normal result in economics is that a
CLEC's profits (which include fixed costs and common costs as factors)
bear no necessary relationship to the amount of competition or consumer
welfare under an imperfectly competitive outcome.
154. Id. at 735.
155. See, e.g., BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 11, at 7, 9, 34.
156. See First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 1 682 (1996).
157. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 4, at 359.
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C. The Ability of ILECs To Negotiate Privately with CLECs
A decision by the Commission not to impose mandatory unbundling of
a particular network element at TELRIC rates would not imply that that
network element would be generally unavailable to competitive carriers.
The pricing of access and the "necessary" and "impair" standards
governing which elements to unbundle are inseparable, as one of us wrote
in 1997: "[The pricing of network access is inextricably linked to the
scope of mandatory unbundling. One cannot say whether or not a particular
unbundling obligation is just and reasonable unless one knows how the
regulator will permit the incumbent firm to price the mandatory network
access associated with that obligation."' 5' The Commission's Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking confirms that assessment. Nothing
prevents voluntary negotiations between incumbents and competitors on the
terms of unbundling. 59 In short, the issue is not whether the ILECs will
unbundle their network elements for use by CLECs, but whether the
government will compel the ILECs to do so at TELRIC prices.
In fact, ILECs have a strong incentive to sell unbundled elements to
competitors at market-determined prices. Increased usage by the CLEC's
customers, and innovative services developed by the CLEC itself, represent
a positive externality (or "network effect") that will be enjoyed by the
ILEC and all its customers on the network. Furthermore, the RBOCs
remain obligated to unbundle loops, local switching, and local transport at
market prices to comply with the competitive checklist that is a
prerequisite, under § 271 of the Telecommunications Act, for an RBOC's
entry into in-region interLATA services.'6
D. Mandatory Unbundling Distorts Incentives
Mandatory unbundling is nothing more than a form of compulsory
sharing. In the telecommunications industry, mandatory unbundling can
impose social costs by distorting the incentives of both incumbents and
entrants.
158. Id at 565; see also J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber. Givings, Takings, and the
Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1068. 1163 (1997) (criticizing the FCC's
use of TELRIC pricing).
159. The recent consolidations in the CLEC industry (for example, the merger of MCI and
WorldCom) would serve as a countervailing source of market power in any voluntary negotiation.
For a review of the recent mergers in the CLEC industry, see Sterling Perrin. The CLEC Market:
Prospects, Problems, and Opportunities, TELEcoMMUNICATIONS INT'L. Nov. 1. 1998, at 41.
160. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
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1. Incentives of Incumbents
Disincentive effects on incumbents are substantial, particularly because
those firms must continue to make large investments in their existing
networks. As noted in Part III, Justice Breyer explained in Iowa Utilities
Board the importance of such incentives: "Nor can one guarantee that firms
will undertake the investment necessary to produce complex technological
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from those
innovations will be dissipated by the sharing requirement." 161 Regulatory
use of cost-based rates (such as TELRIC) creates disincentives for new
investment and for innovation in telecommunications. 162 If the new
investment succeeds, the CLEC can purchase the ILEC's unbundled
element at cost, as set by TELRIC. If the new investment fails, the CLEC
does not bear any of the cost, but the ILEC's shareholders bear the cost of
the unsuccessful investment. Thus, the regulators force the incumbent to
provide CLECs a free option on its investment.1 63 Modem economic and
finance theory demonstrates the value of options, including call options,
which are options to buy an asset."6 By the principle of "conservation of
value" in finance, the Commission's grant of a free option to a CLEC
diminishes the expected return of an ILEC's investment by the value of the
option given to the CLEC.165 Thus, the grant of the option decreases ILECs'
incentives to invest. Regulatory reliance on TELRIC pricing causes these
free options to be given to competitors at the expense of the incumbent.
Even if such an option is never exercised, it nonetheless represents for
the CLEC a thing of considerable value, procured for the CLEC's
advantage by the government through involuntary exchange. The result is a
level of investment and innovation by the ILEC that falls below the
economically efficient level. New services will then be provided at
less-than-economically-efficient levels, and consumers and businesses will
be made worse off.'66 Thus, the "necessary" and "impair" standards should
161. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 751 (1999) (Breyer. J., concurring ill
part and dissenting in part).
162. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 4, at 403-26, 545-51. For a discussion of the
important gains that have been realized by innovation in the Internet, see Jerry A. Hausman,
Telecommunications: Building the Infrastructure for Value Creation, in SENSE AND RESIPOND 63
(Stephen P. Bradley & Richard L. Nolan eds., 1998).
163. See AvINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
(1994); Fisher Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
164. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 471 (3d ed. 1985).
165. For a discussion of conservation-of-value principles, see RICHARD A. BREALIjY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 400-01 (4th ed. 1991).
166. For a discussion of particular cases in which regulations were estimated to cost U.S.
consumers and businesses billions of dollars because of regulatory delay of new services, see
generally Hausman, supra note 12.
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not be applied to new network service elements, lest diminished
competition and decreased consumer welfare result.
For example, consider research and development, or investment in new
services. Many new telecommunications services do not succeed. 67 New
information gateway services, which were unsuccessfully offered by
ILECs, required substantial sunk developmental costs to create the large
databases necessary to provide such services. Under the FCC's TELRIC
price regulation, if a new service is successful, a competitor can buy the
service at its total service long-run incremental cost (TSLRIC). For a
successful new service, the ILEC recovers at most its cost. For unsuccessful
services, the ILEC recovers nothing and loses its sunk investment.' Thus,
the TELRIC regulation is analogous to a rule that would require
pharmaceutical companies to sell their successful products to their generic
competitors at incremental cost and would allow the pharmaceutical
companies to recover their R&D and production costs on their successful
new drugs, but to recover nothing on their unsuccessful attempts.
This truncation of returns, by which a successful new
telecommunications service recovers its cost (but no more) and
unsuccessful new services recover nothing, decreases economic incentives
for regulated telecommunications companies to offer innovative new
services. Thus, as we would expect, tighter cost standards lower the
incentives to innovate. More importantly, as the returns on the innovation
become more uncertain, the expected return and the incentives to innovate
also decrease. (At the same time, under standard option theory, the value of
the option implicitly granted to the CLEC rises dramatically, for it is driven
by the standard deviation of returns on the optioned network element,
which rises with uncertainty.) If the cost-based rate of the unbundled
elements corresponding to the new service were set exactly at the cost of
providing the new service, with no return for R&D costs and no reward for
uncertainty, then regulation would completely eliminate the economic
incentive to provide the new service, because the expected return to the
ILEC would always be negative. Thus, regulation would lead to decreased
introduction of new services, decreased investment, decreased innovation,
and decreased consumer welfare."
The FCC itself explicitly recognized the disincentive effect of
mandatory unbundling on investment in its 1998 Advanced Services Notice
167. See, e.g., A. Michael Noll, Anatomy of a Failure: Picturephone Revisited. 16
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 307 (1992); A. Michael Nol, Conspicuous (Lack of)
Consumption, TELE.COM, Feb. 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 18391710.
168. See Jerry Hausman, Regulation by TSL.RIC: Economic Effects on Investment and
Innovation, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT, Mar. 1999. at 22. 22: Hausman. supra note 12: see also
SIDAK & SPuLBER, supra note 4, at 375.
169. As noted in Part IIL Justice Breyer warned of this perverse outcome. See supra text
accompanying notes 113-114.
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of Proposed Rulemaking.170 In addition, in its 1999 Second Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking on unbundling, the Commission discussed the
ability of competition among carriers to develop and deploy new advanced
services. 17 1 In the same paragraph, the Commission stated, without any
apparent awareness of its self-contradiction, that "it is critical that the
marketplace for these services be conducive to investment, innovation, and
meeting the needs of consumers." 172 The Commission then stated that
the unbundled elements must be offered at cost-based rates.' If the
Commission makes the "necessary" and "impair" standards responsive to
individual competitors and not to competition, it will create economic
disincentives for investment, innovation, and meeting the needs of
consumers. Consistent with this analysis, the social costs of unbundling
owing to the disincentives for incumbents and entrants to invest should be
incorporated into the overall welfare analysis that guides any mandatory
unbundling standards that the FCC formulates for interpreting § 251 (d)(2).
2. Incentives of Entrants
Consumers also suffer from the effect of unbundling on the incentives
of entrants. If there is no existing alternative supply for a network element
but much potential supply, then unbundling will reduce the incentives for
alternative suppliers to enter the fray. Conversely, forbearing from
unbundling will increase the opportunities for entrants, promote facilities-
based competition, and promote diversity for innovation, choice, and
product diversification. To make things worse, unbundling could cause an
already present CLEC to exit.
In May 1997, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission (CRTC) adopted an unbundling policy that is responsive to
such concerns when, in contrast to the FCC's Local Competition First
Report and Order, the agency ordered that Canadian ILECs "should
generally not be required to make available facilities for which there are
alternative sources of supply or which [competitive local exchange carriers]
can reasonably supply on their own." 171 Mandatory unbundling in Canada
extends only to the ILEC's "essential" facilities. 7 5 As the CRTC
understood, compulsory unbundling requirements can deprive facilities-
170. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13
F.C.C.R. 24,012, 95-100 (1998).
171. See Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3. 1 3.
172. Id. This passage is the only reference to investment or innovation in the entire Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
173. See id. 14.




based entrants of opportunities to share costs, achieve efficient scale, and
maximize the utilization of infrastructure that is sunk or comes at zero
marginal costs.
E. The Effects of Removing TELRIC Pricing
Regulated prices that are set on the basis of TELRIC confer implicit
subsidies to those who purchase unbundled network elements.'76 That point
has already been made; its negative implications for efficiency,
competition, and innovation likewise have been noted. Those highly
favorable prices encourage the use of and reliance on unbundled network
elements of the incumbent. They also discourage the use of and investment
in competitors' own facilities. The availability of those UNEs at
inefficiently low prices not only attracts firms that could have deployed
their own facilities, but also induces firms that could not have efficiently
entered or expanded in the marketplace to do so. The subsidized prices
shield inefficient entrants from the true economic prices that they would
otherwise be forced to face.
A problem arises if those subsidized prices are subsequently brought up
to market-based, efficient levels. Clearly, as markets become increasingly
competitive, network elements that are required to become unbundled may
not continue to face that requirement at some point in the future. When
prices are allowed to rise to efficient levels, whether by market forces or by
regulation, those marginal firms may well incur financial difficulties, at
least with respect to the purchase of certain UNEs. Any such difficulties
should not be considered in determining whether the "impairment"
standard has been met. Surely the Telecommunications Act does not intend
any such result. If that measure of "impairment" were entertained, it would
suggest that unbundling should be used indefinitely to support inefficient
producers of telecommunications services. Such an outcome would be
contrary to the interests of competition, consumer welfare, and the public
interest.
The need to ignore the effects of removing subsidies from unbundled
element prices further underscores the need to focus on competition, not
competitors. Assuming that every new competitor in the marketplace is not
inefficient (a result that would imply the existence of a natural monopoly),
there is no need to assess the effect at the individual firm level. It will
suffice to concentrate on competition in the market, appropriately defined.
176. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 4, at 410-12.
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F. The Importance of Sunk Costs
The concepts of "necessary" and "impair" cannot usefully be analyzed
without recognizing the central role of prices and costs in
telecommunications. As we shall explain in greater detail in Part V, within
the essential facilities doctrine, costs have a primary role in the sense that
an essential facility is something that "cannot be economically duplicated."
Thus, as Justice Breyer noted, if the Commission establishes a pricing rule
for unbundled elements that is uneconomically low, it can incorrectly make
an unbundled element appear to be "necessary" or "essential" for
competition, because a CLEC will not be able to self-provide the element at
a cost near the Commission's established price. Nor would the CLEC be
able to buy use of the element from another provider at a price near the
Commission-set price, because of the uneconomically low price that the
agency has set. Thus, the "necessary" and "impair" standards cannot be
considered as a legal doctrine in isolation from the basic economics and
technology underlying the network and the Commission's approach to
establishing the price of unbundled elements.
The economic distinction between unbundled elements that require
only a fixed-cost investment and those that require a sunk-cost investment
plays an important role in both the "necessary" and "impair" standards
and the essential facilities standards.'77 A fixed-cost investment may require
a significant expenditure of capital, but it does not necessarily result in an
element meeting the "necessary" and "impair" standards. Capital markets
work well in the United States, so CLECs can always raise the necessary
capital for an investment in a fixed-cost element. The essential economic
feature of a fixed-cost investment is that if the project does not succeed, the
capital equipment can be used in alternative projects. For example, a
switch, along with its associated software, is largely a fixed-cost
investment. Although the cost of a switch is significant, if the CLEC fails to
attract sufficient business to be successful, the CLEC can sell the switch
and software. Thus, a switch and the associated software cannot lead to an
element satisfying the "necessary" or "impair" requirement of § 25 1 (d)(2),
because a CLEC would not be at a significant economic disadvantage if it
did not have access to the ILEC's switches.
Sunk-cost investments differ from fixed-cost investments because the
capital cannot be recovered from a failed sunk-cost investment. Thus, most
of the invested capital cannot be shifted to an alternative project.'78
Residential loops provide an example of sunk-cost investment. Large
177. The FCC requests commentators to provide an analysis of the effect of sunk costs in
defining the "necessary" and "impair" standard. See Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, supra note 3, 1 26.
178. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 4, at 78-82.
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sunk-cost investments can also provide one of the necessary conditions to
establish the existence of an essential facility, because it may be
uneconomical for the CLEC to attempt to duplicate large sunk-cost
investments given the high degree of risk involved. The Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ignores the relevance of an ILEC's sunk
investment in a network element to mandatory unbundling. Paradoxically, the
FCC's sole concern over sunk costs is their effect on CLECs-whether sunk
costs "would be incurred by requesting carriers if they were to obtain the
network elements through self-provisioning or from other sources outside the
incumbent LEC's network (e.g., those costs associated with entry that are not
fully recoverable if the requesting carrier exits the market)." 179
During the 1996 interconnection proceedings, in response to testimony
regarding the role of sunk and irreversible investments in setting
economically efficient unbundled element prices, one IXC claimed that
many of the ILEC's elements were fixed, but were not sunk-cost
investments.' As we discussed above, if an investment in an unbundled
element is fixed but not sunk, the element cannot satisfy either the
"necessary" or "impair" requirement. A CLEC can always raise the
necessary investment funds in the capital markets and begin competing. If
the CLEC is unsuccessful, the CLEC can always resell, without a
significant economic loss, the capital equipment in which it invested. Only
an element necessitating a sunk-cost investment can satisfy the "necessary"
and "impair" requirements.
G. The Commission's Artificial Justifications for Mandatory Unbundling
1. Conferral of a Valuable Option on the CLEC
If the Commission requires an ILEC to unbundle, at a TELRIC price, a
network element that has a significant sunk cost, the agency is compelling
the ILEC to provide an option to the CLECs.'8 The CLEC can decide to
invest in its own facilities or to buy the use of the unbundled element from
the ILEC. If the element arises from a sunk and irreversible investment, the
option is valuable because the CLEC need not take the risk of investment
but instead can cause the ILEC to take that risk. For the example of
investment in a residential loop, a significant risk exists that over the next
twenty years (or the economic lifetime of a residential loop), wireless
competition or cable competition may cause the prices of services offered
over residential loops to decrease significantly. Moreover, in twenty years
179. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. supra note 3. '126.
180. See First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, I1 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 1 641 n.1562 (1996).
181. See Hausman, supra note 168, at 24-26; Hausman. supra note 12. at 26-35.
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copper-based residential loops may not even be in widespread use because
wireless "loops" may prove to be significantly less costly, or because the
broadband feature of cable television networks may cause demand to shift
away from copper-based ILEC loops. 8 2 If a CLEC buying an unbundled
sunk-cost element from an ILEC were required to sign a contract for the
economic life of the investment (say, twenty years), then the CLEC would
not receive a "free option" from the ILEC.
But the Commission's current pricing policy of using TELRIC for
mandatory unbundling neither requires a CLEC to sign a contract for the
economic life of the element nor provides the ILEC a markup to pay for the
economic value of the option that regulators compel it to issue. Thus,
CLECs can tenably argue that access to unbundled elements is necessary
for all sunk-cost elements because competitive supply of those elements
will not exist. The competitive supply will not arise because the
Commission has set an uneconomically low price for the element that does
not recognize the sunk-cost nature of the required investments. If ILECs are
required to supply unbundled elements at prices below economic costs, they
will be elements that (erroneously) satisfy the "necessary" and "impair"
requirements of § 251(d)(2). Those UNEs will appear to satisfy the
statutory test not for correct economic reasons, but because the Commission
will have cut off any prospect of facilities-based competition through its
pricing policies.
2. Distorting the Price Elasticity of Derived Demand
Regulators distort the apparent need for mandatory unbundling when they
force an ILEC to lease a network element at TELRIC rather than at a price
that incorporates the full option value conferred on the CLEC. Any UNE
priced below its full option value will exhibit artificially higher demand than
would obtain at a price that incorporated that option value. If the demand
curve for the element is linear, then demand will be observed at the more
price-inelastic portion of the demand curve. Thus, asking whether competitors
would substitute away from consumption of the element if the ILEC
attempted to impose a nontransitory price increase of nontrivial magnitude
would automatically lead to a misdiagnosis of market power, for the elasticity
calculation would be made with respect to a starting point that is, by
regulatory distortion, too far down the demand curve.8 3
182. Of course, digital subscriber line (DSL) technology may allow for broadband to be
offered over ILEC loops. The point is that the technological evolution of competition is
sufficiently uncertain to make investment in sunk-cost elements equally uncertain.
183. A technical caveat is necessary here. In the case of an isoelastic demand curve, such as
one associated with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the price elasticity of demand is constant at
all points along the (nonlinear) demand curve. Cf JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIc THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 111-13 (3d ed. 1980)
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Antitrust lawyers and economists will recognize this analytical refinement
to be the converse of the error in the Cellophane case, where the cross-price
elasticity of demand was evaluated at the putatively higher monopoly price."4
In Cellophane, that error falsely overstated the product's cross-price elasticity
of demand at the competitive price.' 5 In the case of the FCC's mandatory
unbundling of network elements at TELRIC prices, a "reverse Cellophane"
problem arises: The FCC's failure to evaluate the price elasticity of demand
for that element at a price that would cover the element's full option value
would falsely understate the element's price elasticity of demand-and hence
the true measure of its degree of "impairment" for purposes of § 251 (d)(2)-
at a competitive price. Simply put, an element that is unnecessary for the
competitive supply of telecommunications services can be erroneously made
to appear to satisfy the "impairment" standard for purposes of § 251 (d)(2) as
long as the ILEC is obliged to sell the unbundled element at a
noncompensatory price, and the FCC declines to correct for that market
distortion.
A related implication of that insight is that the FCC can perpetuate the
apparent need for its regulatory intervention by predicating its mandatory
unbundling rules on determinations of "impairment" that assume that UNE
prices are set at TELRIC levels. The regulator's stimulation of excess demand
for UNEs thus preordains the result that the network element in question must
be subject to mandatory unbundling. The FCC has used that regulatory
strategy for years in another context: the regulation of broadcasting. The
justification for regulatory intervention into the market structure and conduct
of broadcasters was the putative "scarcity" of spectrum, which the FCC itself
controlled through its licensing policies. The FCC artificially created excess
demand for spectrum by underpricing it (at a zero price) and then justified its
intervention as a way to alleviate the consequences of that excess demand.
Judge Stephen Williams has referred to this putative spectrum "scarcity" as
"an excess of demand over supply at a price of zero." t' In the same
(discussing constant elasticity of substitution of the Cobb-Douglas production function). Even in
such a case of an isoelastic demand curve, however, it is still true that the FCC. by setting too low
a price for the UNE, would suppress competitive supply of that element. As will become clear
from our discussion infra Part V, such a regulatory distortion would make it more difficult for the
ILEC to meet the "critical share" calculation, which would establish that the ILEC could not
impair competition in the market for telecommunications services sold to end-users by declining
to lease a particular network element to a CLEC at a TELRIC price.
184. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
185. In the Cellophane case, the government claimed that du Pont was exercising unilateral
monopoly power over food wrappings. By allegedly increasing the price of Cellophane to
monopoly levels, du Pont caused competitors to supply, and consumers to buy, other wrapping
materials. The government claimed that such supply and demand substitution did not prove that
Cellophane would exhibit significant cross-price elasticity at a competitive price. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTIrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 127-28 (1976).
186. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Williams, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing in banc).
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manner, the pricing of UNEs according to the FCC's Local Competition First
Report and Order would exaggerate the demand for, and hence the evident
"necessity" of, the FCC's order of mandatory competitor access to those
UNEs at regulated prices.
3. The Commission's Endogenous Determination of the
Substitutability of Wireline Access for Wireline Loops
Because the Commission controls the amount of spectrum that is
allocated to commercial uses, the agency also controls the availability of
alternative supply of telecommunications services. The amount of spectrum
potentially available to wireless competitors could increase substantially
beyond the current 180 MHz allocated to cellular, personal communications
services (PCS), and enhanced specialized mobile radio (ESMR) spectrum.
Numerous blocks of spectrum are currently scheduled to be auctioned.'87 As
with its underpricing of UNEs, the pace at which the Commission issues
new spectrum licenses may exaggerate the apparent justification for the
mandatory unbundling of wireline networks. This regulatory distortion is
significant because, as we discuss below,'88 the availability of substitute
offerings at the end-user level, such as wireless local loops, constrains the
ability of the ILEC to exercise market power and hence protects consumer
welfare.
V. LIMITING PRINCIPLES DERIVED FROM MODERN
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
Our definitions of "necessary" and "impair" rely on the competitive
analysis of demand and supply substitution that provides the primary basis for
other areas of regulatory economics and, more particularly, that provides the
analytical basis for modern antitrust jurisprudence. In this Part, we first review
the logic and limits of the essential facilities doctrine and examine its
empirical implications with respect to defining relevant markets in both
geographic and temporal dimensions.'89 Next, we apply that understanding of
antitrust analysis to define our test of "impairment." We then extend our
analysis to define "necessary" for purposes of § 251 (d)(2). Finally, we discuss
how related policies of the Commission may distort the conclusions derived
187. For summaries of pending FCC spectrum auctions, see <http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/
auctions> (visited Nov. 22, 1999).
188. See infra text accompanying notes 197, 218-221.
189. The following discussion directly responds to the FCC's request for "comment on the
significance of the essential facilities standard under section 25 1 (d)(2)." Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3, 21; see also id. 9N 22-23. Of necessity, our discussion here
treats in summary fashion a topic that merits lengthier analysis. For a thorough and up-to-date
examination, see generally Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 4.
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from any application of the essential facilities doctrine or market power
analysis to mandatory unbundling.
A. The Logic and Limits of the Essential Facilities Doctrine
The essential facilities doctrine addresses scenarios in which a company
owns a resource that other firms absolutely need to provide their own
services. Properly understood, the doctrine is a common-law rule
concerning the obligation (if any) of a vertically integrated firm to sell an
input to competitors in the downstream market. Federal courts first applied
the essential facilities doctrine to telecommunications networks in MCI
Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.' In that
case, the Seventh Circuit refined the essential facilities doctrines into a
four-part test that requires the plaintiff to show "(I) control of the essential
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility."'
Inherent in the concept of an "essential facility" is the premise that the
owner of that facility possesses monopoly power. The first two elements of
the doctrine incorporate that recognition in a variety of ways. First, some
degree of uniqueness and market control is inherent in the term "essential."
Second, the inquiry regarding the impracticability of duplication ensures
that the doctrine will apply only to facilities for which no feasible
alternative exists or that cannot be reasonably reproduced. Finally, the term
"facility" itself connotes an integrated physical structure or large capital
asset with the degree of cost advantage or unique character that usually
confers monopoly power and market control by virtue of its superiority.
Although, as noted by Justice Breyer in Iowa Utilities Board, the
Supreme Court has never endorsed the essential facilities doctrine," seven
Justices nonetheless agreed in that case that the doctrine might be useful, by
analogy, as a limiting principle in interpreting the "necessary" and
"impair" standards of § 251(d)(2) of the Telecommunications Act.'93 A
strength of the doctrine is that it has shown the capacity to screen out a
multitude of unmeritorious claims.'9 In that respect, the doctrine plainly
rejects the notion, embodied in the Local Competition First Report and
Order, that the public interest is advanced by the simplistic rule that any
compulsory sharing that is technically feasible should be required. Indeed,
190. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
191. I& at 1132-33.
192. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 753 (1999) (Breyer. J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
193. See iL at 734-35; id. at 753 (Breyer, J., concurring in pan and dissenting in part).
194. See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 4.
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as we shall show presently, the technical feasibility of access is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for mandatory unbundling to advance consumer
welfare.
It is inappropriate to apply the essential facilities doctrine to
circumstances in which the owner of the facility lacks monopoly power in
the market for the end service employing the input, because without
monopoly power there can be no basis for applying antitrust principles and
remedies. Justice Breyer seemed to make that point in Iowa Utilities Board:
[A]lthough the provision describing which elements must be
unbundled does not explicitly refer to the analogous "essential
facilities" doctrine (an antitrust doctrine that this Court has never
adopted), the [Telecommunications] Act [of 1996], in my view,
does impose related limits upon the FCC's power to compel
unbundling. In particular, I believe that, given the Act's basic
purpose, it requires a convincing explanation of why facilities
should be shared (or "unbundled") where a new entrant could
compete effectively without the facility, or where practical
alternatives to that facility are available.'95
If the facility must compete for users with other products or services that
are effective substitutes for access to the facility, the discipline imposed by
such competition will suffice to control the conduct of the facility owner.
There will, of course, be instances in which the facility in question will
be somewhat better than the alternatives, but not so much better as to
preclude the continued survival of excluded parties. The colorful exchange
between Justices Scalia and Souter about ladders and lightbulbs'96
confirmed that the Court in Iowa Utilities Board understood this concern in
the context of mandatory unbundling of network elements under the
Telecommunications Act. It may be difficult indeed to determine whether
exclusion from the use of a particular facility will mean inconvenience,
extinction, or some intermediate degree of harm to the excluded competitor.
The point is not that the judgment as to the magnitude of the competitive
disadvantage of exclusion is simpler in principle with one test instead of
another. Rather, the point is that the question of "essentiality" and ease of
duplication-measured by either the potential harm of exclusion or the
potential benefit of inclusion-is no different from, and ought legally to be
the same as, the issue of whether monopoly power is present in the market
for the service produced with the allegedly "essential" facility. The focus
of courts and regulators should be on whether mandatory access to the
195. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 753 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. See id. at 735 n.11; id. at 739 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
supra text accompanying note 76.
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facility will enhance the long-term welfare of consumers, regardless of the
effect on individual competitors.
Because a finding of monopoly power should be a prerequisite to any
further inquiry, any market characteristic that prevents the exercise of
market power should preclude the application of the essential facilities
doctrine. Suppose, for example, that a pipeline is the only means of
transporting oil from the field where it is produced to the city where it is
consumed. Suppose further that some local topographical feature precludes
construction of an alternative pipeline. At first, it might appear that the
refusal of the pipeline owner to permit competing oil distributors to ship
their oil through the pipeline is an act of monopolization by virtue of the
essential facilities doctrine. If oil is readily available to the region from
another source, however, no monopoly constraint on pipeline output (or
enhancement in price) would be rational or, in equilibrium, even possible.
Alternatively, there may be an energy source that is a reasonable alternative
for consumers of oil. In either case, the consequence would be that no
method of transporting oil-regardless of the "facility" by which transport
is supplied-could exercise monopoly power. The demand for use of the
facility is a derived demand based on the underlying demand for the end
product-in this case, consumers' use of energy. 97 The derived demand for
the facility cannot confer greater market power on its owner than exists for
the end product for which that facility would be an input. Under those
circumstances, there is no reason to apply antitrust enforcement
mechanisms, because no change in the conduct of the facility owner would
increase consumer welfare or improve resource allocation.
Facilities with otherwise identical characteristics may have different
antitrust obligations, depending on the availability of substitutes for the
output of the facility. The only shopping mall in a geographically isolated
locality may have antitrust obligations that are not shared by an identical
facility in the suburbs of a metropolis. Equally significant, the same facility
may have different antitrust obligations depending on the time of the suit.
The first shopping mall in a newly developed area may be found to have
monopoly power-that is, the facility may be regarded as "essential" -and
exclusion of competing retailers may well create liabilities under § 2 of the
Sherman Act. The identical shopping mall, however, may lose such
197. See Illinois ex reL Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.. 730 F. Supp. 826. 866 (C.D.
Ill. 1990) (defining the concept of "derived demand"); United States v. Standard Oil Co.. 155 F.
Supp. 121, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("The demand for ocean tankers is a derived demand reflecting
changes in the demand for petroleum and its products. An increase in the demand for crude and its
products would ordinarily bring an increased demand for ocean tankers and an increase in ocean
tanker rates."). The former Interstate Commerce Commission employed such an analysis of
demand and supply substitution in the 1980s when reforming rate-regulation principles for rail
transportation supplied to "captive shippers." See Burlington N.R.R. v. ICC. 985 F.2d 589. 595-
99 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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antitrust obligations once competing commercial real-estate developments
have emerged in the natural growth and development of commercial
real-estate capacity. In short, the essential facilities doctrine should be
temporally bounded, although courts have failed to recognize that
requirement.
The foregoing analysis suggests why, in the vast majority of essential
facilities doctrine cases, the federal courts have declined to find the facility
in question "essential." 198 That pattern has prompted academic criticism of
the essential facilities doctrine, including criticism by one of the present
authors.' 99 The criticisms of the essential facilities doctrine may reflect two
underlying forces, one which is irrelevant to the FCC's interpretation of
§ 251(d)(2) and the other which underscores the need for a limiting
principle.
First, remedies in essential facilities cases necessarily require some
form of regulation. In other words, by hypothesis no remedy of mandated
access can eliminate the underlying monopoly. Once identified, the role of
judicial regulation (through injunction or consent decree) in essential
facilities cases may be judged by the same standards applied to other forms
of public control of natural monopolies. The central thesis derived from this
analysis is that the wisdom of judicial regulation of essential facilities
requires an assessment of the administrative complexity of the relief
proposed. But this consideration is not applicable to a regulatory agency
like the FCC, which already has the expertise and resources to administer a
regime of mandatory access, if one is deemed necessary.
The second criticism directed against the essential facilities doctrine
concerns the incentives created by the doctrine and their dynamic effect on
consumer welfare. As Justice Breyer noted in Iowa Utilities Board,
compulsory sharing of property has social costs because it truncates the




There are obvious social costs when competitors, like children in a
sandbox, are admonished to share. Any case in which the fundamental
output of the facility consists of information or any other form of
intellectual property seems a poor candidate for application of the essential
facilities doctrine. The essential facilities doctrine is, above all, a legal rule
198. Those decisions are surveyed in Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 4, at 1191-93.
199. See Phillip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles. 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989) (arguing that no Supreme Court case has provided a consistent
rationale for the doctrine or has explored either the social costs and benefits or the administrative
costs of requiring the creator of an asset to share it with a rival): Donald 1. Baker, Conpulsory
Access to Network Joint Ventures Under the Sherman Act: Rules or Roulette?, 1993 UTAtI L.
REV. 999 (arguing that the core conceptual problem with compulsory access orders is that
mandating cooperation among businesses is futile); Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 4, at 1191-93.
200. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 753-54 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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of mandatory sharing and compulsory dealings. That characteristic alone is
inconsistent with the exclusivity granted to innovators, which the
government has decided is appropriate to preserve their incentives to create
new properties. The essential facilities doctrine, moreover, is most likely to
condemn intellectual property in precisely those circumstances in which
that result is least defensible: Under the essential facilities doctrine, the
more an invention is unique, valuable, and difficult to duplicate, the greater
the obligation to share it. In short, essential facilities principles are
inherently inconsistent with intellectual property protection.
This consideration regarding intellectual property has direct relevance
to the FCC's interpretation of the "necessary" and "impair" requirements.
The Telecommunications Act contains this solicitude for intellectual
property, for . § 251(d)(2) does not mandate the unbundling of a
"proprietary" network element unless it satisfies both the "impair"
standard and the "necessary" standard. 20 ' Furthermore, those two factors
are what the Commission must consider "at a minimum" when deciding
whether to mandate unbundling.2 2 The FCC's consideration of additional
factors in appropriate cases should tighten rather than expand the focus of
this authority to mandate unbundling in the public interest.
B. Deriving the "Necessary" and "hnpair" Standards from the Essential
Facilities Doctrine
1. Temporal and Geographic Specificity
The FCC should interpret "necessary" and "impair" with temporal and
geographic specificity. The FCC can usefully identify multiple geographic
zones for unbundling purposes without imposing a uniform nationwide
unbundling rule-let alone a uniform nationwide presumption or outcome.20 3
Without temporal and geographic specificity in its mandatory unbundling
rules, the FCC would create a body of law in direct conflict with the antitrust
principles that the Court considered relevant to interpreting § 251(d)(2). The
resulting vision of competition would at best bear no relation to a rigorous
economic understanding of the terms "necessary" or "impair" and at worst
be affirmatively harmful to consumers.
The Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, however,
incorrectly concluded that establishment of minimum national unbundling
201. For proprietary network elements, the statutory requirement is conjunctive:
"necessary. .. and... impair." 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (d)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
202- Id.
203. Cf Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3 (separate statement of
Commissioner Powell) ("I disagree sharply ... that we should designate the same elements of the
incumbent's network for unbundling of every region of the nation.").
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requirements remains valid under the Court's decision in Iowa Utilities
Board.2°' The FCC could "find nothing in the Supreme Court's decision
that calls into question our decision to establish minimum national
unbundling requirements."205 That statement is remarkable because Justice
Scalia's reference to supply substitution for the ILEC's network elements
presupposes a competitive analysis that must 'begin by defining relevant
product and geographic markets. The references by Justices Scalia and
Breyer to the essential facilities doctrine reinforce the premise that
competition must be evaluated with respect to a meaningful geographic
market. The FCC's tentative conclusion about the need to impose
nationwide unbundling requirements is inconsistent with the holding in
Iowa Utilities Board because that conclusion is inconsistent with the
underlying technology used to provide local telephone service and with the
analysis in a number of previous Commission decisions.2° Consider
residential telephone service: The basic technology to provide circuit-
switched local telephone service to residential customers is essentially the
same throughout the United States.207 But, as discussed in many prior
Commission decisions and recognized throughout U.S. telecommunications
policy, costs differ greatly among different geographical areas. Since the
technology being employed is essentially the same, it follows that features
of the geographical areas lead to the large variation in costs.20 s Indeed, the
FCC discusses economies of scale and economies of density that yield
those differences in costs. 2° Those differences in costs would be expected
to lead to differences in competition.21°
When the density of customers is high enough and the number of
customers is large enough in a given geographical area, the economies of
scale and density will either be exhausted or will become sufficiently small
so as not to have an economic effect of any significant magnitude. In that
situation, an ILEC will not have an economic advantage, and economic
analysis leads to the prediction of significant CLEC entry. Indeed,
Commissioner Michael Powell of the FCC correctly recognized the
principle that, when competitors already exist in a particular market, other
204. See id. 1 14.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, Applications of NYNEX Corp., Transferor,
and Bell Atlantic Corp., Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corp. and Its
Subsidiaries, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 49-57 (1997).
207. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Cyberjam: The Law and Economics of
Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 327, 336 (1998).
208. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP: Tilli
PROMISE OF REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICA 80-85 (1995).
209. See Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3. 26.
210. Indeed, the definition and geographical scope of the LATAs took account of customer




firms would not be impaired in their ability to compete if they do not have
unbundled access to the ILEC's network elements, let alone unbundled
access at TELRIC prices.21' Furthermore, that economic analysis is
confirmed by the finding that facilities-based CLECs are much more
prevalent in urban, high-density areas than in more rural areas.- 2
The employment of a single nationwide standard would directly
contradict the market-definition standards found in the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission's Merger Guidelines, " which the
FCC has used in its own recent merger reviews under the public interest
standard of the Communications Act.21 In terms of geographic market
definition, the Merger Guidelines ask whether a hypothetical (unregulated)
monopolist could impose a "'small but significant and nontransitory'
increase in price." 22 That standard is established by determining whether
the hypothetical monopolist would have market power or, alternatively,
would be constrained by firms outside the market. - 6
In a given geographic market, the correct question is whether an
(unregulated) ILEC could exercise market power if it were not required to
provide its competitors a given unbundled element at regulated, cost-based
rates. If other CLECs are already providing competing services using the
element, or if the element itself is available from non-ILEC suppliers, then
an ILEC could not exercise market power. Provision of the unbundled
element by the ILEC would not be necessary for competition in
telecommunications services in the given geographic area. Nor would
competition be impaired if the ILEC were not required to supply the
unbundled element at cost-based rates. It is likely, however, that the
outcome of that analysis would differ depending on the particular element
and the geographical area under consideration.
As an example, consider transport. In a densely settled area with a high
population, such as eastern Massachusetts around Boston (the eastern
Massachusetts LATA), numerous competitors currently provide transport
competition to Bell Atlantic. In rural areas of western Massachusetts,
however, competitor provision of transport is considerably less developed.
Furthermore, Bell Atlantic's costs of providing local service and
211. See Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. supra note 3 (separate statement of
Commissioner Powell).
212. See INDUsTRY ANALYSIS Div., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CO.MMN, REPORT-
LOCAL COMPErI=ON 2 (1998).
213. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552.41,554-58 (1992).
214. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order. Application of WorldCom. Inc. and MCI
Communications Corporation for Transfer of Control of MCI Communications Corporation to
WorldCom, Inc., 13 F.C.C.R. 18,025, Uj 37-39 (1998).
215. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41.556.
216. This approach is similar to that found in economics textbooks. see. e.g.. CARLTON &
PERLOFF, supra note 15, at 801-07, and in the legal literature, see, e.g.. Landes & Posner. supra
note 14.
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transport vary significantly between eastern Massachusetts and western
Massachusetts.
Hypothetically, Bell Atlantic might be able to increase the price of
transport in rural areas of western Massachusetts above competitive levels,
but it could not do so in eastern Massachusetts. Bell Atlantic's competitors
need not provide transport to every location in eastern Massachusetts for
transport to be competitive. Because Bell Atlantic is required to offer
transport under tariff by using nondiscriminatory prices, Bell Atlantic needs
to lose only a relatively small share of its overall transport business in
eastern Massachusetts for an attempted price increase to be unprofitable. If
competitors offer competitive transport to a sufficient number of locations
in eastern Massachusetts, competition will effectively constrain Bell
Atlantic's prices. Thus, the added regulatory mandate that Bell Atlantic
provide CLECs unbundled transport elements in eastern Massachusetts at
TELRIC prices will not affect competition. Transport does not meet that
interpretation of the "impair" standard in eastern Massachusetts. As this
example illustrates, it will be necessary for regulators to make separate
determinations under the "impair" standard for different geographic areas.
It is conceivable that a CLEC would argue that its ability to provide an
end service to consumers would be impaired for purposes of § 251 (d)(2) if
the ILEC did not simultaneously unbundle a particular element throughout
the ILEC's entire service territory. There are two fallacies in such
reasoning. First, it presumes that the service territory is identical to the
relevant geographic market. That will be a factual question, but in general
ILEC service territories spread over far larger expanses than one would
typically regard as a single geographic market for purposes of competitive
analysis. Second, the argument misconceives how entry occurs and how
much entry is necessary to impart competition to a market. Entrants target
their customers, and competition takes place at the margin. As our
discussion of critical share will demonstrate,217 it is the marginal consumers
rather than the inframarginal consumers whose choices determine the
competitiveness of a market. The argument that competition would be
impaired unless a CLEC can simultaneously serve all consumers, marginal
and inframarginal alike, overstates the critical share of the ILEC's
customers that is necessary for the CLEC to capture to produce a
competitive equilibrium.
In summary, whether the FCC should mandate the unbundling of a
particular network element in a particular geographic location at a particular
time should depend on whether such unbundling is necessary to permit the
competitive supply of telecommunications services to end users. The correct
meaning of "impair" for purposes of § 251(d)(2) is whether the ILEC's
217. See infra text accompanying notes 223-229.
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failure to unbundle a particular network element, at a TELRIC price, in a
particular geographic location at a particular time would produce an
equilibrium supply of telecommunications services that was, relative to the
competitive equilibrium, significantly inferior for consumers.
2. Incorporating Derived Demand
An olive is necessary for a good martini. But that does not make an olive
an essential facility, which Rick should be obliged to offer for sale, at cost, to
every other saloon keeper in Casablanca. Although a particular network
element may be essential to producing a bundle of services in a particular
manner, the existence of competition among bundles of services limits the
extent to which that element is essential to the competitive supply of
telecommunications services. More specifically, the development of wireless
voice, data, and vertical services has served to increase the availability of
substitutes for wireline access. This insight about competition at the service
level is analogous to the economic concept of derived demand, which has
been incorporated into antitrust and regulatory law for many years. In the
context of § 251(d)(2), the relevant question is whether competition among
bundles of services produces, for a particular network element, a sufficiently
low level of derived demand such that the element is inessential to producing
a competitive equilibrium.
In the language of economics, "necessity" and competitive "impairment"
are given rigorous economic meaning by computing the price elasticity of
derived demand for any given unbundled network element. That exercise is a
direct application of insights in microeconomic theory explicated early in the
twentieth century by the great British economist, Alfred Marshall.21" Later, in
his classic text on price theory, the late Nobel laureate George Stigler wrote:
"Since the demand for a productive service is indirectly created by the
demand for the product in whose production it is used, the demand for the
service is said to be a derived demand." 2 19 Marshall demonstrated (and Stigler
reiterated) that the elasticity of derived demand for an input varies directly
with (1) the elasticity of demand for the product that the factor produces;
(2) the share of the factor in the cost of production; (3) the elasticity of supply
of the other factor(s); and (4) the elasticity of substitution between the factor in
question and the other factor(s).Y0
The application of Marshall's rules of derived demand can illuminate
whether the demand for a given network element is so inelastic (that is, the
quantity demanded is not sensitive to changes in price) that the element
218. See 5 MARSHALL, supra note 15, at 381-93.
219. STIGLER, supra note 16, at 252.
220. Marshall first derived those conditions for the two-factor case. given constant returns to
scale. See LAYARD & WALTERS, supra note 15, at 259.
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could be considered necessary. The availability of close substitutes to
traditional wireline service such as wireless applications serves to increase
the elasticity of demand for wireline service and hence, by Marshall's first
rule, tends to increase the elasticity of demand for all of the ILEC's
network elements used for voice telephony. As wireless prices approach
wireline prices, fixed (as opposed to mobile) customers begin to substitute
wireless telephones for landline. Some evidence today already indicates an
interest on the part of wireless carriers to serve fixed customers. By
February 1999, AT&T had begun offering digital wireless service in Plano,
Texas, in a package designed to attract customers interested in second lines
for their businesses or homes."'1 By offering consumers a forty-dollar
monthly package of unlimited local calling bundled with voice mail, caller
ID, call waiting, call forwarding, three-way conferencing, and ten-cents-
per-minute long-distance service, AT&T has positioned itself to attract
second-line customers to its standard wireless service.
For ease of exposition, we apply the remaining rules of derived demand
to loops in particular. According to Marshall's second rule, the price
elasticity of derived demand for a network element should rise as the share
of the element in the network costs rises. The intuition is as follows:
Suppose that the price of a network element, which represents a large
portion of the total costs, doubles. Because the price of total network costs
would rise substantially, the demand for additional network services would
fall, and hence the demand for unbundled access to that particular network
element would fall. An example of a network element that represents a
large portion of the ILEC's total network costs is the loop. Thus, Marshall's
second rule implies that the price elasticity of derived demand for loops
would be larger than for other network elements, ceteris paribus, and hence
unbundled loops would be less likely to be considered necessary for
competition.
According to Marshall's third rule, the price elasticity of derived
demand for a loop should increase with the elasticity of supply of another
network element, such as a switch. Intuitively, the more price elastic the
supply of switches, the less the price of switches will fall with a given
reduction in the quantity of switches employed, and hence the greater must
be the reduction in the quantity of loops employed. As other network
elements such as switches and NIDs have become increasingly
competitively supplied, 2 Marshall's third rule of derived demand implies
that the price elasticity of derived demand for loops should be rising.
221. See Jennifer Files, AT&T Test-Markets Mobile Telephone as Alternative to Second
Home Line, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16348120.
222. For a discussion of an example of competition in the switching industry. see Susan




Finally, according to Marshall's fourth rule, the price elasticity of
derived demand for a loop should increase with an increase in the cross-
price elasticity of substitution between a loop and other network elements.
If network elements are used in fixed proportion, then the cross-price
elasticity of substitution between a loop and another network element
would be small. In that case, Marshall's fourth rule of derived demand
would be the only one of the four rules that does not imply a large price
elasticity of derived demand for loops. On the other hand, if technological
change permits network elements to be used in variable proportions,
substitution will occur across network elements, and Marshall's fourth rule
of derived demand will have relevance.
3. The Relevant Product Market and Critical Share
The 1992 Merger Guidelines specify that relevant markets for merger
analysis may be defined for classes of customers on whom a hypothetical
monopolist of the merging firms' products would likely impose a
discriminatory price increase.' Although the DOJ and FTC had attempted
before 1992 to define markets on the basis of the feasibility of price
discrimination, the explicit endorsement of that approach by the 1992
Merger Guidelines has increased the use of this practice by those
agencies.' According to the Merger Guidelines, the task of defining the
relevant product market when price discrimination-is not feasible involves
identifying the smallest set of products for which a hypothetical monopolist
could profitably raise price a "significant" amount (typically five percent)
above the competitive level for a "nontransitory" period of time (normally
assumed to be two years). 5 Thus, under the Merger Guidelines, a potential
market definition is too narrow if, in the face of a five percent price
increase, the number of customers who would switch to products outside
the "market" is sufficiently large to make the price increase unprofitable.
Economists refer to the customers who decide not to purchase the
product (or to purchase less of the product) at the increased price as
"marginal" consumers. For small price increases, they switch from the
products inside the putative "market." Not all customers, however, are
223. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41.552, 41556 (1992).
224. For recent examples of the use of the price discrimination approach of merger guidelines
by the FTC in the petroleum market, see The Exxon-Mobile Merger: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Conmnittee on Comnmerce House of Representatives,
106th Cong. 9-16 (1999) (statement of William J. Baer, Director, Bureau of Competition. Federal
Trade Commission). For similar use of the Merger Guidelines with respect to the airline industry,
see Comments of the Department of Justice, Joint Application of American Airlines, Inc. and
British Airways PLC for Approval of and Antitrust Immunity for Alliance Agreement, No. OST-
97-2058 (May 21, 1998), available in <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/public/conunentsl1777.htm>.
225. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,556. For convenience, we will
use the five percent level, although for some purposes a 10% level may be more appropriate.
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marginal customers. Indeed, in the typical case, most customers would
continue to purchase the product despite the higher price because their
willingness to pay for the product exceeds the raised price. Economists
refer to such customers as "inframarginal" consumers.
In the presence of high demand elasticity and high supply elasticity, a
firm cannot exercise unilateral monopoly power by attempting to decrease
its supply.226 Demand elasticity is captured by a customer's willingness to
switch to competing suppliers as relative prices change. Thus, a broad range
of available substitutes would imply a high own-price elasticity of demand.
Following the same logic as the market definition criteria, the Merger
Guidelines provide a concrete test for evaluating the competitiveness of a
market as captured in the idea of market power, which is the ability of a
single firm unilaterally to increase price above the competitive level for a
"nontransitory" period of time. 27 The Merger Guidelines emphasize the
own-price elasticity of demand, while other analyses focus on the
cross-price elasticity of demand. But the two elasticity measures are closely
related.228
Because competition takes place at the margin, only a small proportion
of the ILEC's customers need to defect to defeat its attempted price
increase. In a simple example, it is possible to calculate that necessary
proportion. Suppose that an ILEC attempted to increase prices on end-user
access by five percent. How much traffic would that ILEC need to lose
before the increase would be unprofitable? The formula to calculate that
"critical share" is:
(1 -MC/P) Q, < (1.05-MC/P) Q,.
An important empirical fact for network elements is that fixed costs are a
very large component of the overall cost, so that marginal cost is a
relatively small component. Assume, for example, that the ratio of marginal
cost to price, MC/P, is 0.2. Then Q, would be 0.94Q,, so that the critical
226. Demand elasticities and supply elasticities have long been recognized in law and
economics as important to assessing the possibility of the exercise of unilateral market power.
See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 14.
227. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,556. The other type of
monopoly power recognized by the Merger Guidelines is coordinated interaction among all
suppliers of a product. Such a possibility is not relevant here because competitors of an ILEC have
very different cost structures and product offerings. Moreover, it is far-fetched to imagine firms
such as AT&T and MCI WorldCom attempting to achieve coordination interactions with the
RBOCs and GTE.
228. The own-price elasticity of demand is the percentage change in demand when the
product's own price is raised by, say, 10%. The cross-price elasticity of demand is the percentage
change in demand in response to the change in a competitor's price by, say, 10%. The two
elasticity measures are related by the Slutsky equation in economic theory. The share-weighted
(negative) own-price elasticity of demand equals the sum of the share-weighted cross-price
elasticities of demand. See, e.g., HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 183, at 22-26.
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share is six percent. Thus, if the ILEC were to attempt to raise its price by
five percent, and if, as a result, it were to lose more than six percent of its
traffic, the attempted price increase would be unprofitable and thus
unilaterally rescinded.2
C. A Proposed Test for the "Inpainnent" Standard
As our discussion makes clear, the existing essential facilities doctrine
sets forth necessary but not sufficient conditions for defining "impairment"
under § 251(d)(2).23" The complete set of necessary and sufficient
conditions includes a fifth requirement, responsive to the explicit text of
§ 251(d)(2), to address whether the denial of access to that network element
at TELRIC prices would impair competition at the end-user level. Our five-
part test is as follows:
The FCC shall mandate unbundling of a network element if, and
only if:
(1) it is technically feasible for the ILEC to provide the CLEC
unbundled access to the requested network element in the
relevant geographic market;
(2) the ILEC has denied the CLEC use of the network element at a
regulated price computed on the basis of the regulator's
estimate of the ILEC's total element long-run incremental cost;
(3) it is impractical and unreasonable for the CLEC to duplicate the
requested network element through any alternative source of
supply;
(4) the requested network element is controlled by an ILEC that is
a monopolist in the supply of a telecommunications service to
229. For a more extensive discussion of critical share, see Jerry A. Hausman et al., Market
Definition Under Price Discrimination. 64 ANTITRUST LJ. 367 (1996).
230. We have previously argued that the essential facilities doctrine identifies necessary, but
not sufficient, conditions for mandatory unbundling at long-run incremental cost. See Hausman.
supra note 168, at 22 ("Economic principles suggest that only the 'essential facility' elements of
the network, which cannot be economically reproduced in the short run by new competitors.
should be unbundled by regulation."), Paul W. MacAvoy & J. Gregory Sidak. lVhat Is Wrong
with American Telecomnunications?, MULTIMEDIA UND REcHT. Mar. 1999. at 15. 15 ("Surely it
is economic folly to mandate unbundling of any network element that is not 'essential' in the
antitrust sense-that is, a network element that cannot be readily duplicated by the entrant or
procured at competitive prices from the same vendors who supply the element to the incumbent
firm subject to the unbundling obligation."), see also ROBERT W. CRANDALL- MANAGED
COMPETITION IN U.S. TELEcOMMUNICATIONS 17 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory
Studies Working Paper No. 99-1. 1999) (" [Tihe decision to unbundle everything and to require its
leasing at cost-based rates is wildly excessive."). For a similar conclusion by German scholars,
applying American antitrust principles to German telecommunications law. see QiRISTOPH
ENGEL & GONTER KNiEPS, DIE VORSCHRiFTEN DES TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSGEErES OBER DEN
ZUGANG ZU WESENTLICHEN LEISTUNGEN (1998); and Christoph Engel. Der lVeg der Deutscher
Telekommunikation in den lVetbewerb, MULTIMEDIA UND REcHT, Mar. 1999, at 7. 12-13. As
noted earlier, Canada employs an essential facilities approach to mandatory unbundling. See supra
text accompanying notes 174-175.
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end-users that employs the network element in question in the
relevant geographic market; and
(5) the ILEC can exercise market power in the provision of
telecommunications services to end-users in the relevant
geographic market by restricting access to the requested
network element.
It is clear that the FCC's requirement of any "technically feasible"
unbundling, articulated in the Local Competition First Report and Order, is
subsumed within our framework and hence is properly characterized as a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for mandatory unbundling at
TELRIC prices. Moreover, we have arranged the order of the requirements
in ascending order of magnitude of the resources necessary for analysis.
This way, if a CLEC cannot demonstrate that a network element meets the
first requirement, then that element is immediately declared inessential, and
society is spared the expenditure of the resources needed to perform the
more intensive analysis required in the subsequent parts of the test. 3'
To implement the fifth element of our test, one must modify the Merger
Guideline's test for unilateral market power only slightly to address the
relevant question in the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-
namely, whether it would impair competition for an ILEC not to sell a




Intuitively, our impairment test asks whether the ILEC can exercise market
power when restricting access to a particular network element to the CLEC
231. We focus here on the "impairment" standard. As we shall explain presently, our
understanding of the "necessary" standard is that it would raise the bar of our five-part test in
cases where the desired element embodied some type of intellectual property to which the ILEC
had a legally recognizable form of protection.
232. Assume, as the Telecommunications Act requires, see 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251(c)(2)(D).
(c)(3), 252(d)(l)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1999), that the ILEC must charge nondiscriminatory prices
for end-user access. If the hypothetical monopolist has the ability to identify the inframarginal
customers, it will have the incentive to charge customers different prices depending on their
willingness to pay for the product. Thus, even though the hypothetical monopolist may not find it
profitable to raise prices five percent above the competitive level uniformly for all its customers. it
may find it profitable to raise prices five percent for some of its customers.
Let c(p, u.) be the critical share of customers that the ILEC must lose to deter the ILEC from
raising end-user access above p when all elements except the nth network element are available to
CLECs at competitive prices. For example, c(30, 2) indicates the critical share of customers the
ILEC must lose to deter the ILEC from raising end-user access above $30 when all elements
except the second network element are available to CLECs at competitive prices. Additionally. let
q(p) be the residual demand for end-user access faced by the ILEC for any given end-user access
price p. We are now ready to state our proposed test for the "impairment" standard of
§ 25 1(d)(2):
Impairment Test: Assume within a market that, by regulatory fiat, the ILEC must
charge nondiscriminatory prices. The regulator should mandate unbundling of some
network element n at its TELRIC price only when I - [q(1.05p) / q(p)]< c(p, u.).
Stated another way, if the share of departing ILEC customers, I - [q(1.05p) / q(p)], exceeds the




in a particular geographic market. If the ILEC cannot exercise market
power (in the output market) when declining to offer a particular network
element at a TELRIC price, then all of the consumer benefits associated
with a competitive outcome have already been secured. Therefore, the
regulator should not order the network element in question unbundled. In
contrast to the method employed by the Commission, our test is focused on
protecting competition as opposed to competitors.
Which market forces might prevent the ILEC from successfully
implementing that price increase? There are at least three such forces. First,
if the ILEC attempts to raise the output price, CLECs will find it profitable
to increase their supply of the output. CLECs could self-supply the network
element in question (for example, switches) or purchase the use of the
element from non-ILEC sources (for example, transport). Second, if the
ILEC raises prices, customers will shift their demand to competing forms of
access, such as cable telephony or wireless for residential customers and
competitive access providers for business customers. With its proposed
acquisitions of MediaOne and TCI and its proposed joint venture with
Time-Warner, AT&T has positioned itself to serve ninety-five percent of all
households in the United States. It is not rational to claim that AT&T, MCI
WorldCom, and all the other CLECs would conspire to keep landline access
prices above the competitive level. Thus, the "critical share" analysis
described above would indicate that, in many situations, CLECs would find
it profitable to replace the ILEC's reduction in supply and thereby defeat
any attempted exercise of unilateral market power by the ILEC. Third,
falling wireless prices will continue to displace traditional wireline users.
Those three constraining forces make it implausible that the ILEC could
exercise market power as defined by the Merger Guidelines. If market
forces can protect consumers from the harms of monopolization, then the
Commission should not impose mandatory unbundling.
Some might argue that the Merger Guidelines approach simply
highlights the ILECs' high market shares for certain services, such as
residential access. But that reasoning is fallacious. Professor William
Landes and Chief Judge Richard Posner some time ago noted that high
market shares in a price-regulated industry are either meaningless from a
competitive perspective or indicative of prices that are set at or below
marginal cost-that is, at or below the price that would obtain in a
competitive equilibrium:
To the extent that regulation is effective, its effect is to sever
market power from market share and thus render our analysis
inapplicable. This is obviously so when the effect of regulation is to
limit a monopolist's price to the competitive price level. A subtler
effect should also be noted, however. Regulation may increase a
firm's market share in circumstances where only the appearance
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and not the reality of monopoly power is created thereby. For
example, in many regulated industries firms are compelled to
charge uniform prices in different product or geographical markets
despite the different costs of serving the markets. As a result, price
may be above marginal cost in some markets and below marginal
cost in others. In the latter group of markets, the regulated firm is
apt to have a 100% market share. The reason is not that it has
market power but that the market is so unattractive to sellers that
the only firm that will serve it is one that is either forbidden by
regulatory fiat to leave the market or that is induced to remain in it
by the opportunity to recoup its losses in its other markets, where
the policy of uniform pricing yields revenues in excess of costs. In
these circumstances, a 100% market share is a symptom of a lack,
rather than the possession, of market power.233
That assessment is directly relevant to the familiar assertion that an ILEC
must possess market power because it has a high share of customers for a
particular service. That reasoning is incorrect. Professor Landes and Chief
Judge Posner noted that in such a case "the causality between market share
and price is reversed. Instead of a large market share leading to a high price,
a low price leads to a large market share; and it would be improper to infer
market power simply from observing the large market share."2 The Ninth
Circuit described that relationship well when it said that "[r]eliance on
statistical market share in cases involving regulated industries is at best a
tricky enterprise and is downright folly where... the predominant market
share is the result of regulation. In such cases, the court should focus
directly on the regulated firm's ability to control prices or exclude
competition." '235 Our proposed test for the "impairment" standard would
provide that proper focus. Moreover, our "impairment" test would provide
the FCC with a mechanism "for removing particular elements from the
unbundling requirements" '236 and for declining to subject particular elements
to mandatory unbundling in the first place.
D. A Proposed Test for the "Necessary" Standard
As we noted in Part II, the elements of the test for establishing
"impairment" are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the
mandatory unbundling of a network element that is "proprietary in nature."
233. Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 975-76.
234. Id. at 976.
235. Metro Mobile CTS v. NewVector Communications, 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted); accord Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 880 F.2d 297, 300 (11 th Cir.
1989), aff'd on reh 'g, 912 F.2d 1262 (11 th Cir. 1990), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 499
U.S. 915 (1991).
236. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3, 1 37.
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For any element embodying a form of legally protected intellectual
property, the "necessary" standard of § 251 (d)(2) would apply. For such an
element, the Commission should recognize that a heightened standard,
beyond impairment of competition, should apply because of the importance
to consumer welfare of innovation that leads to the creation of intellectual
property and because of the uncertainty of success that is inherent in the
innovative process.2 7 For these purposes, we accept as relevant to
§ 251(d)(2) the definition of intellectual property contained in the Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, issued in 1995 by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.'
Although, as noted in Part II, the Commission relied on a dictionary
definition for "impairment," it appears to have defined "necessary"
without any similar reliance on a dictionary. The FCC stated: "'Necessary'
means, in this context, that an element is a prerequisite for competition.""'
The proper dictionary definition of "necessary," however, is considerably
more emphatic than the FCC's definition. The Oxford English Dictionary
gives "necessary" the following primary definition: "[i]ndispensable,
requisite, essential, needful; that cannot be done without."24  Similarly,
Webster's defines "necessary" as "[a]bsolutely required: indispensable." 24
The Commission then compounded its definitional problems by
incorrectly subsuming "necessary" within the definition of "impair": "We
believe that, in some instances, it will be 'necessary' for new entrants to
obtain access to proprietary elements (e.g., elements with proprietary
protocols or elements containing proprietary information), because without
such elements, their ability to compete would be significantly impaired or
thwarted."242  By principally relying on "impairment" to define
"necessary," the Commission created a logical circularity that failed to
differentiate the two requirements.
While our impairment-of-competition standard is based on the ability of
an ILEC to exercise significant market power for a service in the absence of
unbundling, in the case of a proprietary element based on intellectual
237. It has long been recognized in the economics literature that the private incentive to
innovate is too low relative to the socially optimal outcome that maximizes consumer welfare even
when a patent is granted. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
389-414 (1988). The FCC will further decrease the already insufficient incentive to innovate if it
requires mandatory unbundling of elements based on intellectual property and requires them to be
sold at TELRIC-based prices.
238. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) '113,132, at 20,734 & n.] (Apr. I1, 1995). The Guidelines state: -The intellectual property
laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing
consumer welfare." Id. at 20,734.
239. First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 1282 (1996).
240. 10 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 276 (2d ed. 1989).
241. WEBSTER'S H NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 787 (1988).
242. First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 1282.
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property we recommend a standard that provides for unbundling only if
competition is impossible in the absence of unbundling. Thus, an ILEC
might retain some degree of market power based on the intellectual
property, as currently happens with respect to intellectual property in the
rest of the economy. 43 However, so long as competition is possible without
the use of the ILEC's intellectual property, economic incentives will exist
for ILECs and CLECs to negotiate an agreement over terms because the
ILEC will not be able to control competitive entry into the market for
end-user services through its control of the intellectual property. We refer to
our approach for proprietary elements based on intellectual property as the
"absolutely essential" standard because unbundling is appropriate only
when the element is truly necessary for competition.
VI. APPLYING THE PROPOSED TEST FOR "IMPAIRMENT"
TO SPECIFIC NETWORK ELEMENTS
The consumer-welfare approach described in Parts IV and V not only
guides our understanding of the "necessary" and "impair" standards, but also
lends itself naturally to a decision framework for determining whether a
particular network element in a particular market requires unbundling. We
now apply our impairment test to the seven network elements in the Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, as well as to several additional
network elements that either embody new technologies or make possible
new services. We understand Justices Scalia and Breyer to imply that there
is an established body of antitrust case law that provides guidance for the
application of the first four parts of our impairment test. Thus, we focus
primarily on how the fifth part of our test should be applied to network
elements. The clear point that emerges from this analysis is that determining
whether a particular network element in a particular geographic area is
actually an essential facility requires a close empirical investigation of the
specific facts in that geographic market. In the sections that follow, we explain
why demand-side constraints on market power apply to all of the ILEC's
network elements in general, while supply-side constraints can be analyzed at
the level of specific network elements.
243. See, e.g., David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust
Analysis in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 820-22 (1998) (discussing
entrepreneurial rents derived from innovation).
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A. The Influence of Supply-Side Effects on the Unbundling of Specific
Network Elements
From a supply-side perspective, the correct way to assess whether an
ILEC has the ability to exercise monopoly power is to ascertain the
following: If the ILEC attempted to restrict its supply of a given network
element to increase the price of end-user services above competitive levels,
would other providers increase their supply of that network element or
competing network elements sufficiently to defeat the attempted price
increase? If competitors have no barriers to expansion or can gain access to
the network element from an alternative source, then the ILEC cannot
exercise market power in the end-user service market by restricting the
supply of a given element.2" Typically, a competitor providing a network
element will have no binding capacity constraints and it will be able
economically to increase its supply of a given element at current prices.
Since marginal costs are not increasing for provision of network elements, a
fim's current provision of a UNE will demonstrate its ability to expand
supply.245 Thus, for a given network element for which competitive supply
exists, an ILEC will be unable to exercise market power in most situations.
The Supreme Court ruled in Iowa Utilities Board that the FCC needed
to consider the availability of network elements from alternative suppliers
to the ILEC in determining whether the ILEC's supply of a particular
network element met the "necessary" and "impair" standards.2' Thus, an
economic analysis of .the expected supply of a given network element
would be required for the Commission to make a reasoned determination.
Because of the underlying technology of network elements for which fixed
costs are high relative to marginal (or variable) costs, the economic
incentives for non-ILECs that have entered the market to expand their
supply will be very high. With high supply elasticity from competing firms,
the ILEC will not likely be able to exercise market power in the supply of
network elements.
Our impairment test is necessarily stated in the abstract. Regulators
attempting to employ our standard, however, may require simple, objective
market characteristics that would serve as proxies for constraints on an
ILEC's ability to exercise market power. With respect to supply-side
substitution constraints, two market characteristics should be incorporated.
244. The following analysis responds to the FCC's request for -'comment on when we should
deem a substitute sufficiently available so as to render access to the incumbent's network element
unnecessary." Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. supra note 3. 1 2 1; see also id.
24 (asking "how the Commission should consider the availability of network elements outside of
the incumbent's network").
245. Indeed, marginal costs are either constant or decreasing for most UNEs. Otherwise, we
would expect to see numerous small competitors entering the market to supply UNEs.
246. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721,735 (1999).
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
First, regulators should examine whether a CLEC is self-supplying the
element in question in the relevant geographic market. If at least one CLEC
is supplying the element in question, the ILEC cannot exercise market
power in the end-user services market by restricting access to that element.
If the element is not competitively supplied, regulators should next examine
the nature of the costs of the network element to determine whether the
element could be competitively supplied in the short term. In particular, if
fixed (as opposed to sunk) costs represent a large share of the total costs of
the element in question, then the element should not be unbundled. As
explained in Part IV, as long as the asset can be redeployed in a different
geographic market at little cost, the CLEC will face no exit barriers.
Because low exit costs encourage entry, the regulator need not rely on
unbundling of that network element to stimulate competition. 47
Furthermore, as a network element becomes competitively supplied,
TELRIC pricing better approximates the element's market value. But the
proper measure of TELRIC incorporates the value of the option associated
with the forward-looking nature of the investment.24s The competitive price
and the element's TELRIC converge to the same value when only fixed costs
but not sunk costs are present in the element, because the value of the option
under those circumstances converges to zero. Thus, we would predict a
socially perverse relationship between the sunk-cost nature of the ILEC's
network investment on the one hand, and the CLEC's demand for mandatory
unbundling on the other hand. The more likely it is that TELRIC accurately
approximates the market-determined price of an unbundled network element,
the less likely it is that the CLEC will demand mandatory unbundling of that
element, because the value of the free option granted to the CLEC by the
Commission will be near zero. Conversely, the less likely it is that TELRIC
fully compensates the ILEC for the option value of mandatory unbundling of a
particular network element when sunk costs are important, the more likely it is
that the CLEC will demand mandatory unbundling of that element at a
TELRIC-based price. This perverse effect flows from the FCC's failure to
recognize the substantial option value that is associated with the CLEC's right
to compel sharing of the ILEC's sunk investments in network infrastructure.
The effect of the option value on the CLEC's demand for mandatory
unbundling is in addition to the "reverse Cellophane" effect described
247. It is well recognized that a barrier to exit becomes a barrier to entry. For a discussion of
the absence of exit barriers in the wireless industry because fixed investment is amenable to
redeployment by other firms or in other geographic markets, see SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note ,1.
at 78-79.
248. To a limited extent, the Commission recognized this notion of cost in its 1996
interconnection proceeding. See First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, I1 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 1 638-52, 686-95 (1996)
(discussing testimony of Jerry Hausman). For further discussion, see Hausman, supra note 168. at
24-26; Hausman, supra note 12, at 26-35.
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earlier,249 which occurs whether or not the element in question embodies sunk
costs.
1. The Supply of Existing Netvork Elements Listed in the Local
Competition First Report and Order
We now consider how our impairment test would apply to the two most
significant of the seven network elements listed in the Local Competition
First Report and Order. The first such element, local switching, illustrates
how our test would apply to an element with primarily fixed but not sunk
costs. The second network element, an unbundled loop, involves a
relatively greater degree of sunk costs. After we have shown how the
analysis would differ between elements depending on their degree of fixed
versus sunk costs, we then briefly explain why the remaining five elements
would require a regulatory commission to undertake geographically specific
factfinding before it could conclude whether or not those elements meet the
impairment standard of § 251(d)(2). Recall that in this Subsection, we
consider only supply-side substitution constraints on an ILEC's ability to
exercise market power in the end-user services market.
a. Local Switching
The switch is a telephone company's central computer that processes
cross-connections for telephone calls and makes routing decisions on the
basis of some parameter, such as the digits dialed by the customer. --' The
nature of costs for switches and the level of competition in their supply
indicate, for at least three reasons, that switches should not be unbundled in
any geographic market in the United States. First, switches are already
competitively supplied. As of March 1999, over one-third of all RBOC and
GTE rate centers in the United States were served by at least one CLEC
voice switch, and eighteen percent were served by at least two CLEC
switches."
Second, even if one were to assume that switches were not
competitively supplied, the nature of their costs would still indicate that
switches should not be unbundled. In particular, switches are highly
substitutable across wide geographic areas. If a local switch is combined
with digital loop carrier equipment, the switch can provide service to distant
249. See supra text accompanying notes 184-185.
250. See REGIS J. BATEs & DONALD GREGORY. VoicE AND DATA COMMUNICATONS
HANDBOOK 31 (1998).
251. See Peter W. Huber & Evan T. Leo, UNE Fact Report. FCC 96-98 (May 26. 1999)
(submitted by United States Telephone Association and prepared for Ameritech. Bell Atlantic.
BellSouth, GTE, and U S WEST) (on file with 7he Yale Law Journal).
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customers. At a certain point, the cost of transporting calls to a distant
switch becomes more costly than the benefits achieved from the scale
economies of increasing the switch load. According to AT&T, such an
arrangement (combining the local switch with digital loop carrier
equipment) is feasible within a 125-mile radius from the switch.
2 2
Consequently, the relevant geographic markets for switching are large.
Third, it is economically feasible for competitors to self-supply (buy
and install) switches across a wide range of geographic areas. As long as a
CLEC believes that it can serve the minimum number of access lines
needed to operate the switch in an economic fashion, self-supply is a viable
alternative. Because there are no barriers to exit in the switch industry,
mandatory unbundling of switches would not increase competition and
therefore could not improve consumer welfare.
b. Unbundled Loops
In general, loops are much less substitutable than switching because a
large portion of the facility is dedicated to an individual customer, or at
least to a specific street or neighborhood, and is costly to redeploy. But in
many suburban areas there are facilities-based local competitors for
business services. Indeed, unbundled loops for businesses in downtown
areas and other areas where CLECs (or competitive access providers, as
they were formerly known) provide service cannot satisfy the "necessary"
or "impair" standard. Supply-side analysis shows that it cannot impair
competition to decline to lease unbundled loops to those firms at TELRIC
prices. Over time, those CLECs should spread their service to residential
customers as well. In some geographic areas, facilities-based competitors
already serve residential customers.
Given the pace of new technology deployment, suburban and even rural
markets need to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
and where unbundled loops are essential facilities. Even if one considers
only the constraints on market power due to CLEC supply opportunities,
unbundled loops may be essential facilities in some markets but not in
others 325' The Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, however,
presumes that loops must be unbundled: "It is our strong expectation that
under any reasonable interpretation of the 'necessary' and 'impair' standards
of § 25 1(d)(2), loops will be generally subject to the § 25 1(c)(3) unbundling
252. See Petition of AT&T Corp. To Deny Application, GTE Corp. & Bell Atlantic Corp. for
Consent to Transfer of Control, FCC 98-184, at 24 (Nov. 23, 1998) (on file with The Yale Law
Journal).
253. This section addresses only supply-side effects. With respect to demand-side constraints
on market power, as soon as AT&T begins to supply cable telephony, unbundled loops should no
longer meet the impairment test. At that time, an ILEC should no longer be compelled to supply
CLECs unbundled loops at a TELRIC price.
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obligations." 2s If the Commission were to incorporate demand-side
substitution possibilities, as we do in the following section, the agency would
have to revise its expectation that mandatory unbundling of loops will be
necessary.
c. Other Network Elements
As the preceding discussion shows, the question of whether or not to
mandate unbundling of a network element depends on factual questions
concerning the level of actual competition in the supply of the requested
element and the degree to which the costs of the element are sunk or fixed.
The answers to those questions are likely to vary from one geographic
market to another for the reasons we have discussed earlier. For four of the
five remaining elements-namely, NIDs, interoffice transmission facilities,
signaling networks, and operations support systems-the regulatory
commission would have to undertake geographically-specific fact finding
before it could conclude whether or not those elements are competitively
supplied, and if not, whether they could be competitively supplied in a
reasonable period of time. Finally, we believe operator services and
directory assistance, the remaining element, need not be unbundled in any
geographic market because they are competitively supplied, as one state
PUC recently concluded."5
2. New Technologies for Which the FCC Potentially Could Mandate
Network Unbundling
Market evidence demonstrates that mandatory unbundling of the
ILECs' broadband networks and the services they deliver is not required to
permit competition. Because an ILEC does not have market power in the
delivery of broadband services, the network elements that the ILEC uses to
supply those services cannot be essential facilities. Competition in
broadband services is underway without any compulsory unbundling of the
ILECs' network elements. Indeed, in its 1999 report to Congress on the
deployment of advanced telecommunications capabilities, the Commission
recognized the current state of broadband competition that exists without
any use of ILEC network elements:
Numerous companies in virtually all segments of the
communications industry are starting to deploy, or plan to deploy in
254. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3. 132.
255. See Order Granting Petition, Petition of U S WEST Communications, Inc. for
Competitive Classification of its Directory Assistance Services, Dkt. UT-990259 (Wash. Utils. &
Transp. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1999), available in 1999 Wash. UTC LEXIS 346.
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the near future, broadband to the consumer market. Current
providers include cable television companies, incumbent LECs,
some utilities, and "wireless cable" companies. 6
Because cable companies' lines currently pass more than ninety-five
percent of U.S. homes, it follows that mandatory unbundling of the ILECs'
broadband networks is not necessary for competition in broadband services,
nor would competition be impaired if the ILECs' broadband networks were
not unbundled.
Furthermore, although the ILECs' loops in certain geographical areas
may be subjected to mandatory unbundling under the impairment standard,
as we discussed above, the ILECs' broadband backbone facilities should
not be unbundled. Again, the Commission recognized in its 1999 report to
Congress that competition is proceeding without mandatory unbundling of
the ILECs' broadband networks: "We consider investment in both
backbone facilities and the 'last mile.' We find that broadband backbone
facilities are being deployed in a reasonable and timely manner." 117 In the
same report to Congress, the FCC also observed:
Deployment of broadband, both backbone and last mile, is
occurring on a major scale, for both business and consumer
markets. American business and the capital markets are obviously
betting that broadband will be successful in the business and
consumer markets and many companies are rushing to seize part of
that success. We expect that this sizeable investment by numerous
companies will translate in the near future into significant
deployment of broadband capability.
28
Regulatory intervention is not required when competition is thriving, and
unnecessary regulation can distort otherwise competitive markets. Thus, if
the Commission applies to § 251(d)(2) a competition-based consumer-
welfare standard, as we have urged, rather than a competitor-welfare
standard, the factual findings in the Commission's own 1999 report to
Congress demonstrate that no unbundling of the ILECs' broadband
networks should be required.
Furthermore, mandatory unbundling of the ILECs' broadband networks
at TELRIC-based costs would very likely decrease innovation and the
introduction of new broadband services to consumers for the reasons that
we discussed previously. An ILEC is unlikely to invest in a new broadband
service if it knows that the FCC will compel it to sell to its competitors at
256. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 1 12 (1999).




TELRIC prices the network elements used to supply that service if the
service proves to be commercially successful. The Commission seems to be
oblivious of the impact of mandatory unbundling on ILEC investment in
advanced services:
We also see nothing in the statute or the Supreme Court's opinion
that would preclude us from requiring that loops that must be
unbundled must also be conditioned in a manner that allows
requesting carriers supplying the necessary electronics to provide
advanced telecommunications services, such as digital subscriber
line technology (xDSL). 59
The Commission's gift of a free option to CLECs is not costless to society
as a whole, for it will decrease innovation and thereby harm consumers,
contrary to the explicit goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
3. Combinations of Elements
Our test can be adapted to evaluate combinations of elements. The
Commission stated in its Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
"[t]he ability of requesting carriers to use unbundled network elements,
including combinations of unbundled network elements, is integral to
achieving Congress' objective of promoting rapid competition in the local
telecommunications market." Our proposed impairment test, as described
earlier, supposes that all but a single network element are competitively
supplied to CLECs. If the CLEC can demonstrate that the ILEC's restriction
of unbundled access to the remaining element at a TELRIC price would allow
the ILEC to exercise market power in the output market, then that element
should be unbundled at its TELRIC price. Stated differently, our impairment
test is conducted on a "stand-alone basis." One may argue, however, that our
test does not consider cases where sets of network elements are not
competitively supplied. In those circumstances, would competition in the
output market be impaired? Two cases must be cqnsidered.
First, suppose two network elements failed to meet the impairment test on
a stand-alone basis. If it would not impair the competitive supply of
telecommunications services for the FCC to refrain from mandating the
unbundling of a nonproprietary element, then it necessarily follows that such
an element is one that, when assembled with other elements that failed to pass
the impairment test on a stand-alone basis, produces a competitive service that
259. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3. 1 32; see also id. '1 34
(seeking comment on whether to "modify the definition of 'loops' or 'transport' to include dark
fiber"); id. 135 (seeking comment on mandatory unbundling of DSLAMs and packet switches).
260. Id. 2.
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the FCC should forbear from regulating entirely. In those cases, the set of
network elements should not be unbundled at TELRIC prices.
Second, suppose that one network element, A, failed to meet the
impairment test on a stand-alone basis, while the restriction of access to
another network element, B, was shown to impair competition at the output
level. The Commission might reason in the following way: Element A
failed the impairment test only because the CLEC could rely on element B
in the hypothetical. Recall that all other network elements are assumed to
be competitively supplied in the stand-alone test. In those cases, the burden
of proof should be on the CLEC to demonstrate that the cost of supplying
element A conditional on supplying element B is sufficiently less than the
cost of supplying element A alone. If the CLEC could not demonstrate
significant cost synergies, then element A could not be reclassified as
essential.
Finally, consider the case of the "UNE platform," where all of the
ILEC's network elements are considered simultaneously as a single
"element." The logic developed earlier implies that as long as any one
element of the UNE platform fails to meet the impairment test on a
stand-alone basis, the UNE platform as a whole should not be unbundled at
TELRIC prices. The only condition under which the UNE platform should
be unbundled at TELRIC prices is when each of the elements of the UNE
platform individually passes the impairment test on a stand-alone basis. For
the reasons discussed above, that condition cannot hold in the face of the
clearly competitive supply of elements such as switching and directory
assistance.
B. The Influence of Demand-Substitution Effects on the Unbundling of
All Network Elements
In contrast to the supply-side effects articulated above, the demand-side
effects do not influence each network element on an individual basis. From
a demand-side perspective, the correct way to assess whether an ILEC has
the ability to exercise monopoly power is to ascertain the following: If the
ILEC attempted to raise prices for end-user access while restricting its
supply to CLECs of a given network element, would consumers find an
alternative source of acceptable end-user service? Consumers could make
that choice without considering whether a particular network element or set
of network elements was competitively supplied to CLECs. Any consumer
substitution in response to an increase in the price of end-user services
constrains the ILEC's market power across all network elements. Demand
elasticity at the output level does not differentially affect individual network
elements at the input level. Thus it would be unproductive for the FCC to
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attempt to apply this portion of the impairment test at an element-specific
level.
It is well-known that the price elasticity of demand for any good
increases with the availability of suitable substitutes." In recent years,
credible substitutes for traditional landline service have begun to emerge
that should increase the price elasticity of demand for traditional voice
telephony services. For example, Cox Cable is offering local telephony
service over its coaxial cable plant in parts of Orange County and San
Diego, California; Phoenix, Arizona; Omaha, Nebraska; Hampton Roads,
Virginia; and parts of New England. 2 AT&T's recent purchase of TCI, its
bid for Media One, and its alliance with Time Warner would give the firm
access to fifty-five percent of cable customers in the United States.0
In addition to cable, wireless technologies are being deployed in an
increasing number of geographic areas. For example in Piano, Texas,
AT&T's "Wireless Home Phone Option" is designed to compete directly
with the local exchange service of the wireline incumbent, GTE. The plan
offers unlimited airtime within the fixed local calling area (that is, the home
cell site) at a price comparable to GTE's basic service. Also, AT&T is
testing a fixed wireless local loop, known as "Project Angel," that is
designed to fill in coverage gaps in AT&T's cable network. AT&T can
provide users with up to four telephone lines, each capable of carrying
voice, high-speed data, and video through an antenna-like device installed
outside the user's house.' Wireless local loops are likely to be the
preferred access technology in rural areas because they are a cost-effective
way to transmit signals to remote residences. For example, in Regent, North
Dakota, fixed wireless services from Western Wireless allow customers to
connect regular home telephones to wireless base station units in order to
get competitively priced local and long-distance services while effectively
bypassing the wireline local loop.' Such developments in the demand
substitutability of alternative access technologies provide a clear answer
when the FCC asks in the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
about "the relevance, if any, to the interpretation of the 'necessary' and
'impair' standard, that we are reexamining these issues today, more than three
years after passage of the [Telecommunications] Act." '-
261. See, e.g., STIGLER, supra note 16, at 24.
262. See Alex Best, Senior Vice President, Engineering, Cox Communications, Presentation
at 1999 Fifth Annual Goldman Sachs Communications Technology Retreat (Mar. 1. 1999) (on file
with The Yale Law Journal).
263. See Paul Farhi, AT&T: Too Big Once Again?, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1999, at El.
AT&T would pass a much higher percentage of homes.
264. See Rebecca Blumenstein, AT&T Plans To Enter Some Areas Using 'Fixed Wireless"
Technology, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1999, at B6.
265. See Joe Gardyasz, Phone Co-Op Pulls Plug on Wireless Competitor, BISMAtRCK TRIB..
Jan. 13, 1999, at 5.
266. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaldng, supra note 3, 1 14.
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The first competitive constraint on any exercise of ILEC market power
is cable telephony. Wireless telephony is an additional constraint on market
power. Barring any coordinated interaction among firms providing
competitive technology platforms, competition in voice telephony should
be robust, and demand substitutability should be high. Thus, little
regulatory intervention is warranted.
Demand-substitution constraints on the ILEC's ability to exercise market
power also may come from consumers' demand for bundles of services that
include local voice telephony. As the FCC acts according to a belief that
competition requires extensive mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices,
competitors of the ILECs pursue a business strategy of acquiring (through the
capital market) network elements at market prices, on the assumption that
consumers demand bundled services.
An unstated premise of the FCC's interpretation of the mandatory
unbundling provisions in § 251 and § 252 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 seems to have been that those statutory provisions should be read in a
demand-substitution vacuum. Although the Telecommunications Act
ostensibly removed artificial regulatory distinctions based on the particular
technology employed to produce a communications service, the administrative
rulemakings and federal court litigation that dominated the first three years of
experience under the new statute focused on the traditional narrowband
wireline access network. Indeed, developments in cable telephony and
wireless local loops may soon make the entire exercise of wireline unbundling
irrelevant. Yet, far from considering the relevance of demand substitution to
interpretation of § 25 1(d)(2), the Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking asks whether the FCC should truncate its analysis of all relevant
sources of supply substitution.267 The FCC evidently does not contemplate any
evaluation of demand substitution whatsoever.
It is inconsistent for the FCC to emphasize forward-looking TELRIC
costs for pricing unbundled network elements and yet retain a
backward-looking view of product definitions and demand substitution for
telecommunications services. Put differently, it is not "forward-looking" for
the FCC to presume that a current product definition for telecommunications
service will remain constant over time, especially when there is strong
evidence that the bundling of services may redefine the relevant product
market for purposes of competitive analysis. In discussing the problems
created by TELRIC pricing for unbundled network elements, one of us
observed in 1997:
267. See id. 128 (asking "whether and the extent to which the language of the statute and the
Supreme Court's opinion constrain the factors that we can or should consider in evaluating the
availability of elements outside the incumbent's network").
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Like Janus, regulators alternate between past and future
perspectives on markets as doing so serves their purpose. The
result, which we call the Janus artifice, is an inconsistent economic
analysis of competition and pricing. When evaluating the prospects
for competition, regulators often look to the past, emphasizing the
sunk costs of the incumbent LECs and past market share. For
pricing purposes, however, regulators look to the future, promoting
their notion of forward-looking costs. Regulators can only
compound the fallacies inherent in the forward-looking cost
approach when they engage in shifts in perspective that are meant
to facilitate desired policy outcomes.
"-68
In contrast, antitrust analysis implies that the relevant product markets for an
end product or an essential facility must be continually revised over time.
Given those considerations and the growth of bundled services successfully
offered by the ILECs' competitors, the FCC runs the risk that its unbundling
policy will be irrelevant to competition before it is even fully implemented-
and thus obsolete and harmful to consumer welfare.
C. The Relationship Between an "Efficient-Competitor" Standard and
the Consumer-Welfare Standard
We have argued at length that the FCC should use consumer
welfare, not competitor welfare, as the touchstone for interpreting
the "impairment" standard of § 251 (d)(2). That said, suppose that the
Commission nonetheless inclined toward a competitor-welfare approach,
but attempted to mitigate the harm that such an approach would
impose on consumers by mandating unbundling only if the CLEC were
deemed to be an efficient competitor. In other words, the FCC would
ask whether the ILEC's failure to unbundle the network element at a
TELRIC-based price would impair an efficient competitor's ability to
provide telecommunications services to end users. What would be the
practical difference between an efficient-competitor standard and the
consumer-welfare test that we propose? How would the FCC or a reviewing
court reconcile the two seemingly disparate techniques?
To compare the two approaches, it is useful first to articulate the
circumstances under which both standards would produce the same result
for a given unbundled network element. Recall that our five-part consumer-
welfare standard asks whether the ILEC can exercise market power in the
output market for end-user services. That is, can the ILEC raise prices in
the output market in a nontrivial way for a nontransitory period of time? In
contrast, the efficient-competitor standard focuses on competition in the
268. S[DAK & SPULBER, supra note 4, at 425.
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input market and asks whether there is a competitive supply of network
elements. It is critical to recognize, however, that competition in the output
market does not depend solely on the level of competition for one of the
inputs. Competition in the input market is a sufficient, but not necessary,
condition for competition to be effective in the output market.
Thus, whenever competition exists in the input market for a particular
network element, both the efficient-competitor and the consumer-welfare
standards will indicate that mandatory unbundling would be inappropriate.
According to the efficient-competitor standard, a CLEC could, under those
conditions, self-supply the network element or purchase it at competitive
rates and thereby effectively compete against the ILEC. Similarly, the
consumer-welfare standard would indicate that, under those conditions, the
ILEC would be constrained from exercising market power in the end-user
services market by attempting to deny a CLEC access to the competitively
supplied network element in question.
Under other conditions, however, the two standards would produce
divergent outcomes. Suppose that within a well-defined geographic market
the ILEC is the sole supplier of the network element requested by a CLEC.
Suppose further that, within the same geographic market, the ILEC faces
intense competitive pressure in the end-user services market from AT&T in
the form of voice telephony provided over TCI's coaxial and fiber-optic
infrastructure. Under those circumstances, the efficient-competitor standard
would indicate mandatory unbundling of the requested network element. To
the contrary, the consumer-welfare standard would indicate that no
mandatory unbundling of the network element in question would be
warranted. That example highlights the major shortcoming of the efficient-
competitor standard-it ignores that alternative sources of supply in the
output market constrain the ILEC's ability to exercise market power. It is
clear from the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, consistent
with an efficient-competitor standard, the FCC's approach to interpreting
§ 251(d)(2) incorrectly focuses on competition in the input market while
ignoring competition in the output market.269 The Table summarizes the
differences in outcomes that would result under TELRIC prices from the
Commission's use of the consumer-welfare standard, the efficient-
competitor standard, and the original standard in the Local Competition
First Report and Order.
269. See Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3, 42 (" [Wle seek
comment on whether the existence of a competitive market for a network element is necessary to
demonstrate that an element is sufficiently available outside the incumbent's network so that
failure of the incumbent to provide the element would not be 'necessary' or would not 'impair' a
carrier's ability to provide service.").
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TABLE: COMPARISON OF THE OUTCOMES RESULTING FROM THE
APPLICATION OF THREE DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR MANDATORY
UNBUNDLING AT TELRIC PRICES
Se~ari. "Technical- Efficient- Consumer-
(Is unbundling feasible? Is the network Feasibility Competitor Welfare
dement competitively supplied? Is the Standard Standard Standard
::onpt competitivel -supplied?)
Unbundling is not technically feasible, Do Not Do Not Do Not
UNE is competitively supplied, output is Unbundle Unbundle Unbundle
competitively supplied (N, Y, Y)
Unbundling is not technically feasible, Do Not Do Not Do Not
UNE is competitively supplied, output is Unbundle Unbundle Unbundle
not competitively supplied (N, Y, N)
Unbundling is not technically feasible, Do Not Do Not Do Not
UNE is not competitively supplied, Unbundle Unbundle Unbundle
output is competitively supplied
(N, N, Y)
Unbundling is not technically feasible, Do Not Do Not Do Not
UNE is not competitively supplied, Unbundle Unbundle Unbundle
output is not competitively supplied
(N, N, N)
Unbundling is technically feasible, UNE Unbundle Do Not Do Not
is competitively supplied, output is Unbundle Unbundle
competitively supplied (Y, Y, Y)
Unbundling is technically feasible, UNE Unbundle Do Not Do Not
is competitively supplied, output is not Unbundle Unbundle
competitively supplied (Y, Y, N)
Unbundling is technically feasible, UNE Unbundle Unbundle Do Not
is not competitively supplied, output is Unbundle
competitively supplied (Y, N, Y)
Unbundling is technically feasible, UNE Unbundle Unbundle Unbundle
is not competitively supplied, output is
not competitively supplied (Y, N, N)
Unbundling Results 4 of 8 2 of 8 1 of 8
Note: We assume that the efficient-competitor standard, like the consumer-welfare
standard, incorporates a technical-feasibility requirement.
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As the Table shows, the FCC's original rule of "technically feasible"
unbundling would mandate unbundling in half of the possible scenarios.
With respect to its outcomes (as opposed to its intellectual grounding),
the efficient-competitor standard resembles the FCC's original "technically
feasible" unbundling rule more closely than does our proposed
consumer-welfare standard.
The preceding comparison of the efficient-competitor standard with our
proposed consumer-welfare standard presupposes that it would be feasible
for the FCC to define in the abstract, and identify in the concrete, an
"efficient" CLEC. There are multiple reasons, however, to expect that such
an exercise would be daunting. There is no reason to expect CLECs to be
homogeneous firms, such that the FCC could make uniform assumptions
about production technologies. CLECs vary in size, lines of business,
regulatory burdens or advantages, brand name recognition, and so forth.
AT&T, for example, has cable television and wireless businesses through
which it can offer local access for voice telephony, as well as a brand name
that is immediately recognizable to consumers. MCI-WorldCom, as of
September 1999, had neither cable television nor wireless, and the company
presumably still faces challenges in uniting the separate corporate identities
of MCI and WorldCom. Meanwhile, Sprint has wireless, no cable
television, and extensive operational experience as a traditional ILEC in a
number of geographic markets. Which of those three firms would the FCC
deem the most "efficient" for purposes of an efficient-competitor standard
for § 251 (d)(2) and why? The question becomes even more difficult in light
of the fact that MCI-WorldCom announced in October 1999 its intention to
acquire Sprint.27" Furthermore, how would the FCC evaluate the efficiency
of smaller CLECs, such as Winstar or Teligent or RCN, relative to the
efficiency of the large IXCs?
The FCC, of course, could undertake engineering-cost modeling of a
hypothetically efficient CLEC. But that prospect cannot be regarded as
appealing or promising. By comparison, the Commission undertook to
model the costs of a hypothetically efficient ILEC in order to generate
TELRIC estimates with which to establish proxy rates for UNEs. That
exercise generated controversy and litigation."' More fundamentally, as a
matter of both jurisdiction and economic policy, the FCC would be treading
on shaky ground if, in the name of implementing its policy of mandatory
unbundling, it resorted to creating ersatz cost-of-service regulation for
unregulated CLECs.
270. See Laura M. Holson & Seth Schiesel, MCI To Buy Sprint in Swap of Stock for $108
Billion, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1999, at Al.
271. See Hausman, supra note 168, at 24-26; see also SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 4, at
421 (discussing the Hatfield model).
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In short, if the FCC were to interpret §251(d)(2) under an
efficient-competitor standard, it would invariably be compelled to make
precisely the kinds of predictions about "best" technologies that Congress
resolved, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, that the market is better
suited to supply. The Commission emphasized shortly before its issuance of
the Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that it would not hazard
such predictions.272 Clearly, such intervention would not " reduce regulation"
in the pursuit of "lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers."273
VII. PROCEDURES FOR EFFICIENTLY ADMINISTERING
THE IMPAIRMENT TEST
Economic analysis should guide the Commission in establishing
evidentiary rules for mandatory unbundling proceedings and in allocating
factfinding responsibilities between the state public utility commissions and
the FCC itself.
A. Evidentiary Burdens and Sunset Mechanisms
Through its design of evidentiary rules, the FCC should create efficient
incentives for ILECs and CLECs to discover and reveal information about
optimal network design, usage, and investment. Here, the Commission should
apply the legal scholarship on economic analysis of evidentiary law.'74
Evidentiary presumptions and burdens of proof under § 251 (d)(2) should be
assigned to the party (ILEC or CLEC) that is the most efficient producer of the
information sought. In most cases, that party will be the CLEC. The rebuttable
presumption, therefore, should be that mandatory unbundling of any given
network element at a TELRIC price is not required by § 251(d)(2). That
allocation of evidentiary burden would be analogous to the plaintiffs burden
of proof in an essential-facilities-doctrine case.275
272. In early 1999, the FCC stated: "Our role is not to pick winners and losers, or to select
the best technology to meet consumer demand. We intend to rely as much as possible on free
markets and private enterprise." Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion. 14
F.C.C.R. 2398, 1 5 (1999).
273. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl.. 110 Star. 56, 56.
274. See Richard D. Friedman, Economic Analysis of Evidentiary Law: An Underused Tool.
an Underplowed Field, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1531, 1533 (1998); Bruce L Hay, Allocating the
Burden of Proof, 72 IND. LJ. 651 (1997); Jason S. Johnston. Bayesian Fact-Finding and
Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAl L REv. 137
(1987); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L REv.
1477 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Air Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 410 (1973).
275. See Apartment Source, L.P. v. Philadelphia Newspapers. No. 98-5472, 1999 WL
191649, at *7-*8 (E.D. Pa- Apr. 1, 1999).
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If CLECs are currently the most efficient producers of the information
sought regarding the competitive justifications for mandatory unbundling,
then it is even more likely CLECs will also be the most efficient producers of
information in the future. In the Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Commission sought "comment on an approach that would
allow sunset or modification of the unbundling obligations as technology and
market conditions evolve over time." 2 76 At the end of a finite time horizon, or
upon the entry of a facilities-based competitor, the unbundling order should
sunset automatically. Specifically, the passage of two years (the time horizon
used in the Merger Guidelines), or the entry of a facilities-based competitor
of the stature of AT&T, MCI-WorldCom, or Sprint, should provide the
Commission the requisite "passage of time or occurrence of certain events"
after which the mandatory unbundling obligations for the ILEC's elements
should sunset "without any subsequent action by the Commission." 77 The
CLEC should bear the burden of proving that continued mandatory
unbundling of the element is indispensable for consumer welfare.
B. The Proper Role of State Commissions in Administering the Proposed
Test
The state public utilities commissions (PUCs) should play an active
role in administering the "necessary" and "impair" requirements. The FCC
is capable of announcing a general standard for determining whether a
network element is subject, under § 251(d)(2), to mandatory unbundling at
TELRIC prices. But the FCC correctly noted in its Second Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking that "application of the 'necessary' and 'impair'
standards that we develop pursuant to § 251(d)(2) may be relatively
fact-intensive." 278 More important, many of the critical facts are likely to be
unique to a particular geographic market and are thus directly "relevant to a
decision to impose minimum national unbundling requirements." 
279
To apply our five-part test for "impairment," regulators should
examine data on the network facilities and equipment that competitors have
actually deployed, intend to deploy, or are capable of deploying over the
relevant time horizon, to supply service in a relevant product market and
geographic market. Regulators should examine as well the implications for
276. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3. 11; see also id. 36
("[Wihether the Commission should adopt a mechanism by which network elements would no
longer have to be unbundled at a future date."); id. (" [W]hether affirmative steps by the parties or
the Commission should be necessary to remove a particular element from unbundling
requirements, or whether affirmative action should be necessary to continue requiring the






facilities-based entry in that geographic market of the substantial
acquisitions, by AT&T and other telecommunications carriers, of the
nation's largest competitive access providers, cable television multiple
system operators, and wireless carriers. AT&T's expenditure of (or
commitment to spend) more than $100 billion on acquisitions of cable
television networks, which has all occurred in the three years following the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act, calls into question whether it is
necessary for competition that AT&T receive unbundled access at TELRIC
prices to ILEC network elements in areas where it now owns cable networks
or has joint ventures with other cable network owners. Furthermore, it is
extremely unlikely that competition would be impaired in those areas if
AT&T did not have access to unbundled elements at regulated prices, because
those cable networks pass over ninety-five percent of households, and AT&T
has announced that the networks will be used to provide telephone and
internet services. Thus, application of our impairment test to the areas in
which AT&T has cable networks would likely yield different conclusions
from those for areas in which AT&T does not own cable networks or have
joint ventures with other cable parmers.
The sheer volume of unbundling proceedings that can be expected, and
the numerous questions that those proceedings will necessarily present
regarding competitive conditions in particular geographic markets, will
severely tax the FCC's resources, in particular because the Commission has
properly committed itself to "resolving these fact-intensive questions ... in
an expedited time frame." ' That administrative burden may prove to be
especially great because the FCC acknowledged in late 1998 that "[i]t does
not yet possess the detailed information necessary to evaluate the current
state of local telephone competition on a market-by-market basis."'"
Because markets create and process vast quantities of information, it is
challenging enough for regulators to digest all of the pertinent economic
facts concerning competition in a particular service in a particular
geographic market. Surely it would overwhelm even the most indefatigable
regulatory staff to try to digest, simultaneously and centrally from
Washington, the salient facts in all of the relevant product markets and
geographic markets for local telecommunications services in the
United States. 2 Yet, the FCC has no alternative to undertaking such
geographically specific analysis-unless, of course, the agency's economic
analysis of optimal unbundling principles (as opposed to the application of
those principles to specific cases in specific geographic markets) would
enable the FCC to conclude that a particular network element could not
280. IL 12.
281. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS Div., supra note 212, at 3.
282. See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society. 35 AMI. EcON.
REv. 519 (1945).
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satisfy the "necessary" or "impair" requirement in any geographic market
in the United States and thus should be removed altogether from the list of
potential network elements subject to mandatory unbundling at TELRIC
prices.283
Fortunately, the state PUCs have the resources and factfinding
experience to assist the FCC in conducting the analysis that is essential to
administer the "necessary" and "impair" standards with the requisite
degree of geographic specificity. Indeed, Congress already recognized that
state regulators have a comparative advantage in compiling and analyzing
facts about local competition in particular geographic markets. Congress
did so through its design of both the local competition provisions2 and the
interLATA entry provisions2 85 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Between the fall of 1996 and the Supreme Court decision in Iowa Utilities
Board, issued in January 1999, the state PUCs held hundreds of local
arbitration proceedings to set the prices for unbundled network elements
and the discounts for wholesale services.286 Similarly, the checklist
process under § 271 directly involves the state commissions in precisely
the kind of geographically specific factfinding that would properly
inform the implementation of the "necessary" and "impair" requirements
of § 251(d)(2).
In short, Congress concluded in 1996 that the states are competent to
conduct the fact-intensive arbitration proceedings envisioned in § 252 and
the equally fact-intensive analyses of local telecommunications markets
envisioned in the competitive checklist of § 271. It is reasonable to expect
that those same state commissioners are competent as well to apply a
general rule enunciated by the FCC, pursuant to its Second Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, to the specific facts concerning the relevant
product markets and geographic markets within those commissioners'
respective states. Uniform national outcomes are neither necessary nor
conducive to consumer welfare.
It is therefore appropriate to conclude that the "states may, consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision, apply [the FCC's] interpretation of
§ 251 (d)(2) to determine in the first instance that a network element need
not be unbundled in light of the availability of that element outside the
incumbent's network in that state."28 7 Basic principles of the economics of
283. Cf Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3, 36 (discussing
"whether the Commission should adopt a mechanism by which network elements would no
longer have to be unbundled at a future date").
284. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(b) (West Supp. 1999).
285. See id. § 271(c)(1)(A) (describing the requirements for state approval of the RBOC's
generic interconnection plan); id. § 271(c)(1)(B) (setting forth alternative procedures if no
requests for interconnection are forthcoming); id. § 272(b) (providing a competitive checklist).
286. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 4, at 1082-83.
287. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 3, 114.
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information support the conclusion that Congress intended, through its
enactment of the Telecommunications Act, for the states to play an active
role in determining whether a particular network element in a specific
geographic market is subject to mandatory unbundling at arbitrated (which
is to say, regulated) prices. If, as seems most reasonable to infer, Congress
already gave the states that authority, then it would be unnecessary for the
FCC to adopt rules purporting "to delegate to the states responsibility for
removing network elements from any national unbundling requirements"
that the FCC promulgated. 8 Economic reasoning counsels that Congress
already commended that power to the states, such that the Commission in
fact has no "opt out" authority to delegate to them. Like the unbundling
rules themselves, the extent of the states' participation in the
implementation of § 251(d)(2) should not be regarded by the FCC as being
conditional on its exercise of "regulatory grace."'s
As we discussed above, separate local telecommunications markets
exist with different degrees of competition throughout the United States.
For the FCC to attempt to establish rules for each of those local
telecommunications markets would be extremely time consuming if the
proper fact-intensive investigation were performed for each
telecommunications market. If the FCC instead were to take a broad-brush
approach without considering and analyzing the market-specific factors, the
agency would likely err in many of its decisions. In turn, those errors would
reduce both innovation in and the quality of telecommunications services
available to consumers, a result that would frustrate the objectives of the
Telecommunications Act.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Even after the Supreme Court's remand in Iowa Utilities Board, the FCC
continues to interpret its authority to mandate the unbundling of the local
telecommunications network at regulated, cost-of-service prices in a manner
that is at war with the antitrust laws. The agency's interpretation of
"necessary" and "impair" for the purpose of § 251(d)(2) cannot find support
in sound economic analysis, because no responsible economist could defend
subordinating the welfare of consumers to the welfare of individual
competitors. The proper interpretation of § 251 (d)(2) would give primacy to
consumer welfare and would use the competitive analysis of demand
substitutability and supply substitutability, as the long-established tools of
economic analysis of competition and of antitrust jurisprudence, to ensure, as
Congress directed, that the unbundling rules successfully "promote
288. 1& 138.
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competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher
quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." 290
Our impairment test asks whether the ILEC could exercise market
power in the end-user services market by restricting access to a particular
network element. Regulators attempting to employ our standard, however,
may require simple, objective market characteristics that would serve as
proxies for constraints on an ILEC's ability to exercise market power in the
end-user services market. In particular, three market characteristics should
be incorporated into the decisionmaking process:
(1) Whether a CLEC is self-supplying the element in question in
the relevant geographic market. As long as one CLEC is
supplying the element in question, the ILEC cannot exercise
market power in the end-user services market by restricting
access to that element.
(2) Whether fixed (as opposed to sunk) costs represent a large
share of the total costs of the element in question. As long as
the asset is redeployable, the CLEC will not face barriers to
exit, which in turn, implies low entry barriers. Thus the ILEC
cannot exercise market power in the end-user services market
by restricting access to that element.
(3) Whether AT&T or any other firm offering cable telephony has
established a presence in the relevant geographic market. As
long as one firm is offering cable telephony service, the ILEC
cannot exercise market power in the end-user services market
by restricting access to that element.
The first two conditions represent supply-side substitution constraints,
while the third condition is a demand-side substitution constraint on the
exercise of market power in the end-user services market.
With respect to the Telecommunications Act's goal of "promoting
competition," our analysis and proposed test of "impairment" are rooted in
economic analysis of competition and antitrust law, which are designed to
promote consumer welfare. Our proposed test for "impairment" would
follow Congress's directive to "reduce regulation." 29' In contrast, the
competitor-welfare approach of the Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and the Local Competition First Report and Order would
expand regulation because any CLEC could trigger regulatory intervention
by asserting that its profitability would be diminished by the inability to
lease the ILEC's unbundled elements at TELRIC prices. Our approach
requires that the CLEC's request for a particular unbundled network
290. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl., 110 Stat. 56. 56.
291. Id.
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element satisfy the four existing requirements of the essential facilities
doctrine and then also meet a fifth requirement, based on critical share, that
examines whether an attempt by the ILEC to deny the CLEC access to the
element in question would decrease competition in the output market for
telecommunications services. In so doing, our impairment test advances
consumer welfare and provides the "limiting principle" that the Supreme
Court demanded in Iowa Utilities Board.

